[154072] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: LinkedIn password database compromised
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Michael Thomas)
Sat Jun 23 22:10:42 2012
Date: Sat, 23 Jun 2012 19:09:32 -0700
From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
To: Keith Medcalf <kmedcalf@dessus.com>
In-Reply-To: <2bce6257d310384a9e0cd3b5bf71e3f3@mail.dessus.com>
Cc: "nanog@nanog.org" <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On 06/23/2012 05:52 PM, Keith Medcalf wrote:
> Leo,
>
> This will never work. The "vested profiteers" will all get together an=
d make it a condition that in order to use this method the user has to ha=
ve "purchased" a "verified" key from them. Every site will use different=
profiteers (probably whoever gives them the biggest kickback).
What is their leverage to extort? A web site just needs to make the
client and server end agree on a scheme, and they control both ends.
They can't force me to use their scheme any more than they can force
me to not use Basic and use their scheme instead. Keep in mind that
asymmetric keys do not imply certification, and asymmetric keys are
cheap and plentiful -- as in a modest amount of CPU time these days.
Mike
> You will end up paying thousands of dollars a year (as a user) to buy=
multiple keys from the profiteers, and provide them all sorts of private=
information in the process. They will then also insist that web sites u=
sing this method provide "tracking" information on key usage back to the =
profiteers. The profiteers will then sell all this information to whomev=
er they want, for whatever purpose, so long as it results in a profit. S=
ome of this will get kicked back to participating web sites. Then there =
will be "affiliate programs" where any web site can "sign up" with the pr=
ofiteers to "silently" do key exchanges without the users consent so that=
more tracking information can be collected, for which the participating =
affiliate web site will get a kickback. Browser vendors will "assist" by=
making the whole process transparent. Contracts in restraint of trade w=
ill be enforced by the profiteers to prevent any browser from using the "=
method" unless it is completely invisible to the user.
>
> Then (in the US) the fascist government will step in and require "regis=
tration" of issued keys along with the verified real-world identity linka=
ge.
>
> If it does not use self-generated unsigned keys, it will never fly.
>
> ---
> () ascii ribbon campaign against html e-mail
> /\ www.asciiribbon.org
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Leo Bicknell [mailto:bicknell@ufp.org]
>> Sent: Wednesday, 20 June, 2012 15:39
>> To: nanog@nanog.org
>> Subject: Re: LinkedIn password database compromised
>>
>> In a message written on Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 02:19:15PM -0700, Leo Veg=
oda
>> wrote:
>>> Key management: doing it right is hard and probably beyond most end u=
sers.
>> I could not be in more violent disagreement.
>>
>> First time a user goes to sign up on a web page, the browser should
>> detect it wants a key uploaded and do a simple wizard.
>>
>> - Would you like to create an online identity for logging into web
>> sites? Yes, No, Import
>>
>> User says yes, it creates a key, asking for an e-mail address to
>> identify it. Import to drag it in from some other program/format,
>> No and you can't sign up.
>>
>> Browser now says "would you like to sign up for website 'foobar.com'",=
>> and if the user says "yes" it submits their public key including the
>> e-mail they are going to use to log on. User doesn't even fill out
>> a form at all.
>>
>> Web site still does the usual e-mail the user, click this link to veri=
fy
>> you want to sign up thing.
>>
>> User goes back to web site later, browser detects "auth needed" and
>> "public key foo" accepted, presents the cert, and the user is logged i=
n.
>>
>> Notice that these steps _remove_ the user filling out forms to sign up=
>> for simple web sites, and filling out forms to log in. Anyone who's
>> used cert-based auth at work is already familiar, the web site
>> "magically" knows you. This is MUCH more user friendly.
>>
>> So the big magic here is the user has to click on "yes" to create a ke=
y
>> and type in an e-mail once. That's it. There's no web of trust. No
>> identity verification (a-la ssl). I'm talking a very SSH like system,=
>> but with more polish.
>>
>> Users would find it much more convenient and wonder why we ever used
>> passwords, I think...
>>
>> --
>> Leo Bicknell - bicknell@ufp.org - CCIE 3440
>> PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
>
>
