[151669] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: BCP38 Deployment
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Eric Brunner-Williams)
Wed Mar 28 12:55:47 2012
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 12:54:44 -0400
From: Eric Brunner-Williams <brunner@nic-naa.net>
To: nanog@nanog.org
In-Reply-To: <D57C460F-FEC9-4E63-91F0-171D6A9A3C2A@virtualized.org>
Reply-To: ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On 3/28/12 11:45 AM, David Conrad wrote:
> Actually, given the uptick in spoofing-based DoS attacks, the ease in which such attacks can be generated, recent high profile targets of said attacks, and the full-on money pumping freakout about anything with "cyber-" tacked on the front, I suspect a likely outcome will be proposals for legislation forcing ISPs to do something like BCP38.
in a note (which didn't go anywhere in particular) i pointed out that
contract may address the same issue for which legislation may be
proposed, at least for "contractual closures" (sorry, a term of my
own, defined below) which share the property some jurisdictions have
of a finite access provider universe.
i mean "contractual closure" to be the performance guarantee (or
non-performance guarantee) present in a set of contracts for a
particular service.
think "china", after first abstracting all the negatives associated
with policy as a property of a distributed, shared, public resource,
or "firewalls 4 (bcp defined) good".
-e
