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Re: BCP38 Deployment

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (David Conrad)
Wed Mar 28 12:51:19 2012

From: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAFANWtVDu2pzn3asRM9nWb1Bz3DicK1MXQDeFr6VGrBss13rkQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 09:50:04 -0700
To: Darius Jahandarie <djahandarie@gmail.com>
Cc: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org

On Mar 28, 2012, at 9:39 AM, Darius Jahandarie wrote:
> I think the concern of RFC3704/BCP84, i.e., multihoming, is the
> primary reason we don't see ingress filtering as much as we should.

I would be surprised if this were true.

I'd argue that today, the vast majority of devices on the Internet (and =
certainly the ones that are used in massive D(D)oS attacks) are found =
hanging off singly-homed networks.

Regards,
-drc



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