[149492] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: UDP port 80 DDoS attack
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (dennis)
Mon Feb 6 07:23:32 2012
From: "dennis" <dennis@justipit.com>
To: "Keegan Holley" <keegan.holley@sungard.com>,
"Dobbins, Roland" <rdobbins@arbor.net>
In-Reply-To: <CABO8Q6QuoU6=0YfaLH_ZcMHwN-hOcWSJhQ1nZXJEFRiRonsJBA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2012 07:22:38 -0500
Cc: NANOG Group <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
The point is well taken that cloud scrubbing can be an essential component
of mitigating a volumetric flood. However, it is important to note that
DDOS attacks do not only consist of volumetric floods. Current attacks
often incorporate a multi-vectored attack campaign including a combination
of low and slow and application layer attacks on upper layer protocols, ie.
DNS & HTTP(s). These campaigns are designed to fly under the triggers of
other flow based analysis (cloud scrubbing) protections in place today. As
with any security protection a layered approach is required in order to
protect the perimeter from DDOS. In addition to the previous
recommendations of ACL, uRPF, RTBH, CoPP, inspection of the full stack is
required. The best protection today includes a detector capable of
inspecting the full stack and signaling back to the cloud scrubbing station
to swing the route if the attack becomes volumetric. The premise device
should have technique in order to challenge the source and counter the
attack with intelligence. I'm aware of two vendors offering some of these
capabilities today, Radware and Arbor.
--------------------------------------------------
From: "Keegan Holley" <keegan.holley@sungard.com>
Sent: Sunday, February 05, 2012 8:37 PM
To: "Dobbins, Roland" <rdobbins@arbor.net>
Cc: "NANOG Group" <nanog@nanog.org>
Subject: Re: UDP port 80 DDoS attack
> 2012/2/5 Dobbins, Roland <rdobbins@arbor.net>
>
>>
>> On Feb 6, 2012, at 8:10 AM, Keegan Holley wrote:
>>
>> > An entire power point just to recommend ACL's, uRPF, CPP, DHCP
>> > snooping,
>> and RTBH?
>>
>> Actually, no, that isn't the focus of the preso.
>>
>> > The first four will not work against a DDOS attack
>>
>> This is incorrect - suggest you read the preso.
>>
>
> The ACL's are configured on the routers belonging to the victim AS which
> will not save their access pipe if it's overrun unless I'm missing
> something. uRPF may help with spoofed traffic, but sometimes causes
> problems with multi-homing and is often more harmful than helpful
> depending
> on the network design.
>
>>
>> > and the last one just kills the patient so he does not infect other
>> patients.
>>
>> S/RTBH - as opposed to D/RTBH - doesn't kill the patient. Again, suggest
>> you read the preso.
>>
>
> Source RTBH often falls victim to rapidly changing or spoofed source IP"s.
> It also isn't as widely supported as it should be. I never said DDOS was
> hopeless, there just aren't a wealth of defenses against it.
>
