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From: Leigh Porter <leigh.porter@ukbroadband.com> To: "Dobbins, Roland" <rdobbins@arbor.net> Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 21:08:26 +0000 In-Reply-To: <46BAD2CA-614E-4F8F-A876-14160213BAD3@arbor.net> Cc: North American Network Operators' Group <nanog@nanog.org> Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org On 8 Nov 2011, at 18:24, "Dobbins, Roland" <rdobbins@arbor.net> wrote: >=20 > On Nov 9, 2011, at 1:14 AM, <bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com> wrote: >=20 >> that was/is kindof orthoginal to the question... would the sidr plan fo= r routing security have been a help in this event?=20 >=20 > SIDR is intended to provide route-origination validation - it isn't inte= nded to be nor can it possibly be a remedy for vendor-specific implementat= ion problems. >=20 > Validation storm-control is something which must be accounted for in SID= R/DANE architecture, implementation, and deployment. But at the end of th= e day, vendors are still responsible for their own code. >=20 >=20 Indeed, we can expect new and exciting ways to blow up networks with SIDR.= =20 -- Leigh ______________________________________________________________________ This email has been scanned by the MessageLabs Email Security System. For more information please visit http://www.messagelabs.com/email=20 ______________________________________________________________________
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