[144216] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Owen DeLong)
Mon Sep 5 18:11:56 2011
From: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAJHGrrR3pZG37OGShi44azhC+ABkJWmQUMhc1TQZPyVBVKwPYQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2011 15:09:32 -0700
To: Sharon Goldberg <goldbe@cs.bu.edu>
Cc: North American Network Operators' Group <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
>=20
>> 3. I think the discussion on the list so far misses what I see as the =
central question about the economic assumptions in that paper. The =
paper assumes that all destinations are equally valuable, which we know =
is not the case. This implicitly (and perhaps mistakenly?) shifts the =
balance of power to tier-1 ISPs, whereas in practice, it may be with =
other ASes (e.g., Google). In practice, ISPs may be willing to spend =
significant amounts of money to reach certain destinations or content =
(some destinations are more valuable than others... e.g., Google). If =
the most "valuable" destinations deployed S-BGP and made everyone who =
wanted to connect to them deploy it, that would be more likely to =
succeed than the approach taken in the paper, I think.
>=20
> Our paper does not assume all destinations are equally valuable.
>=20
> 1) As mentioned in our response to Randy, we weight content
> providers more heavily (see Section 6.8.1; we ran experiments where
> the content providers collectively source 10%, 20%, 33% or 50% of
> Internet traffic).
>=20
The point here, however, is that the value is subjective. Not all =
content providers
are equally valuable. An access provider will get many complaints from =
users
if they are unable to reach some content providers (e.g. google) while =
they will
get relatively few complaints if they are unable to access others
(e.g. hasthelargehadroncolliderdestroyedtheworldyet.com).
Owen
