[144204] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Owen DeLong)
Mon Sep 5 10:22:15 2011
From: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
In-Reply-To: <20110905124724.GA8292@ussenterprise.ufp.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2011 07:18:28 -0700
To: Leo Bicknell <bicknell@ufp.org>
Cc: North American Network Operators' Group <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Sep 5, 2011, at 5:47 AM, Leo Bicknell wrote:
> In a message written on Sun, Sep 04, 2011 at 04:16:45PM -0400, Sharon =
Goldberg wrote:
>> An ISP might deploy S*BGP in order to increase the volume of traffic
>> that it transits for its customers.
>=20
> I think this phrase summarizes the problem with this argument nicely.
>=20
> If, as an ISP, deploying a "secure" routing protocol changes my
> traffic positively or negatively something is wrong. Securing the
> routing system should not alter the routing system.
>=20
> I'm afraid as long as it does this work has an uphill battle.
>=20
One could argue that rejecting routes which you previously had no way to
know you should reject will inherently alter the routing system and that =
this
is probably a good thing.
Owen
