[140221] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Suspecious anycast prefixes
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Danny McPherson)
Thu May 5 12:27:09 2011
From: Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net>
In-Reply-To: <4DC2C923.80200@tiggee.com>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 12:27:04 -0400
To: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On May 5, 2011, at 11:58 AM, David Miller wrote:
>=20
> IF things are not functioning properly and the operator of the service =
is depending on end consumers of the service to notify them of which =
node is malfunctioning, then it is time for the operator of the service =
to go back to the drawing board and improve their monitoring and failure =
resolution systems.
Hehh.. As you well know, there are many folks that invest=20
enormous time and money into this, and yet realize, that ultimately,=20
there are influencers in the routing system and data path between=20
the client and the service node that the service operators can't=20
control. All they can do is best enable service consumers to=20
identify and incorporate controls that are optimal for their operating=20=
environments.
> ...but it *is* expressly about selection of nodes...
It enables visibility and transparency which can be employed to=20
inform measurement and detection systems. IF / how an operator=20
chooses to apply controls based on that information (e.g., drop=20
a prefix originated from an unauthorized origin AS or leaked via=20
a known bad path) that's certainly their prerogative.
-danny
