[136173] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: A top-down RPKI model a threat to human freedom? (was Re:
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Michael Hallgren)
Tue Feb 1 16:49:46 2011
From: Michael Hallgren <m.hallgren@free.fr>
To: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
In-Reply-To: <35655C23-B950-4F5B-A63A-0CCAB7442859@delong.com>
Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2011 22:36:37 +0100
Cc: carlos@lacnic.net, nanog@nanog.org
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
Le mardi 01 février 2011 à 13:20 -0800, Owen DeLong a écrit :
> On Feb 1, 2011, at 9:14 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
>
> > On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Martin Millnert <millnert@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> Here be dragons,
> > <snip>
> >> It should be fairly obvious, by most recently what's going on in
> >> Egypt, why allowing a government to control the Internet is a Really
> >> Bad Idea.
> >>
> >
> > how is the egypt thing related to rPKI?
> > How is the propsed rPKI work related to gov't control?
> >
> RPKI is a big knob governments might be tempted to turn.
>
> >> architecturally/technologically *impossible* for a entity from country
> >> A to via-the-hierarchical-trust-model block a prefix assigned to some
> >> entity in country B, that is assigned by B's RIR and in full
> >> accordance with the RIR policies and in no breach of any contract.
> >
> > countries do not have RIR's, countries have NIR's... regions have RIR's.
>
> RIRs live in countries with governments.
> RIRs are unlikely to mount a successful challenge against an organization
> with tanks and mortars.
Yes, right. But RIR is (at least supposed to be) regional, so
(hopefully) more stable from a policy point of view (since the number of
national "stake holders" need to agree on a common policy). In theory,
at least...
mh
>
> Owen
>
>
