[13605] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Inbound prefix filters
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bradley Reynolds)
Wed Nov 12 02:20:22 1997
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 1997 02:17:05 -0500 (EST)
From: Bradley Reynolds <brad@b63695.student.cwru.edu>
To: nanog@merit.edu
On Tue, 11 Nov 1997, John A. Tamplin wrote:
> Actually, I view it the other way. If someone is announcing routes for one
> of our prefixes, connectivity is at least partially broken for that prefix,
I think the whole point of filtering is that you will not
send packets to that newly announced route. You can access-list
it and if you suddenly see matching on some deny, then you
can investigate at somewhere like nitrous and figure out who
is announcing what. In general, I would not be willing to sacrifice
the performance of the people who are paying me m0ney just to be able to
quickly? ascertain who is causing the problem.
> BTW, this has happened to us twice, and both times the offender was a
> direct competitor in one of our local markets. Does anybody have any
> feel for how often these "accidents" are not accidents?
>
Time to slap the kiddies for playing with daddy's router.
brad reynolds
ber@cwru.edu
"Faith: not wanting to know what is true."
-- Friedrich Nietzsche
