[136005] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Level 3's IRR Database
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Christopher Morrow)
Mon Jan 31 15:11:31 2011
In-Reply-To: <4D46FCA3.1050509@toonk.nl>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 15:11:27 -0500
From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
To: andree@toonk.nl
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 1:17 PM, Andree Toonk <andree+nanog@toonk.nl> wrote=
:
> Hi Randy,
>
> .-- My secret spy satellite informs me that at 11-01-30 11:18 PM =A0Randy=
Bush
> wrote:
>
>> so i am not sure what your point is. =A0please clarify with a concrete
>> example.
>
> Adjusting a route's degree of preference in the selection algorithm based=
on
> its validation state only works if it's exactly the same prefix.
>
> Jack already sort of explained what I meant, but here's an example
>
> Assume that youtube's prefix had a roa like this
> Origin ASN: =A0 =A0 AS36561
> Prefixes: =A0 =A0 =A0 208.65.152.0/22
>
> Now AS17557 start to announce a more specific: 208.65.153.0/24. Validator=
s
> would classify this as Invalid (2).
> If we would only use local-prefs, routers would still choose to send it t=
o
> AS17557 (Pakistan Telecom) as it's a more specific.
>
> So in cases where the invalid announcement is a more specific, the only w=
ay
> to prevent 'hijacks' is to actually drop these 'invalid' announcement fro=
m
> day one.
>
> I understand this is by design, but I can imagine some operators will be
> reluctant to actually drop routes when they start testing RPKI deployment=
s
> in their networks.
yes, but what is the way forward?