[135930] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Level 3's IRR Database
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Carlos Martinez-Cagnazzo)
Sun Jan 30 21:23:18 2011
In-Reply-To: <201101302153.VAA20188@sunf10.rd.bbc.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 00:22:41 -0200
From: Carlos Martinez-Cagnazzo <carlosm3011@gmail.com>
To: Brandon Butterworth <brandon@rd.bbc.co.uk>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Reply-To: carlos@lacnic.net
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
Hi,
this is the second mention I see of RPKI and Egypt in the same
context. I sincerely fail to see the connection between both
situations.
Egypt cut their links the old fashioned way: they pulled the plug. I
fail to see how such a situation could be made worse by RPKI. It
simply has nothing to do.
Not deploying RPKI won't prevent your local friendly autocrat from
ordering "cut all wires" or something like that.
regards
Carlos
On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 7:53 PM, Brandon Butterworth
<brandon@rd.bbc.co.uk> wrote:
>> > I think it is too early in the deployment process to start dropping
>> > routes based on RPKI alone. We'll get there at some point, I guess.
>>
>> Do we really *want* to get to that point?
>
> I thought that was the point and the goal of securing the routing
> infrastructure is laudable. But the voices in my head say don't trust
> them with control of your routes, see what happened in Egypt.
>
> brandon
>
>
--
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Carlos M. Martinez-Cagnazzo
http://www.labs.lacnic.net
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