[13289] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: NAT etc. (was: Spam Control Considered Harmful)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Paul A Vixie)
Sat Nov 1 15:41:10 1997
To: nanog@merit.edu
In-reply-to: Your message of "Sat, 01 Nov 1997 21:11:53 +0100."
<199711012011.VAA28754@vader.runit.sintef.no>
Date: Sat, 01 Nov 1997 12:34:13 -0800
From: Paul A Vixie <paul@vix.com>
[ I just removed these addresses:
Havard.Eidnes@runit.sintef.no
smd@clock.org
peter@wonderland.org
jlewis@inorganic5.fdt.net
paulp@winterlan.com
...from the recipient list, since I know they are all on NANOG. I would
not be offended by each of the above people thanking me publically for
not making them see two copies of this reply. Perhaps that would set
some kind of an example for the rest of the audience, most of whom just
say "reply-all". ]
Havard said:
> ...which brings me to think if it isn't so that Secure DNS (at
> least as currently specified) and widespread deployment of NAT
> boxes which fiddle with the contents of DNS reply/request packets
> isn't exactly a properly working combination. As I understand it
> you can have NAT or Secure DNS with e.g. signed A records but you
> can't (easily?) have both.
This is a misdirected concern. DNS clients inside a NAT cloud are
already proscribed from seeing DNS data from other NAT clouds or from
the Internet itself. The NAT technology has to strip off DNSSEC stuff
when it imports data but it tends to strip off DNS delegation and
authority data as well, and tends to alter the address and mail exchange
records. NAT borders are already DNS endpoints, with or without DNSSEC.
Whether and how to regenerate external DNS inside a NAT cloud is a matter
of NAT implementation, but the fact that it's _regenerated_, not forwarded
or recursed, is a design constant.
