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From: Steven Bellovin <smb@cs.columbia.edu> In-Reply-To: <772A6AAF-DA7B-4A98-94F5-AA62222DB4AB@virtualized.org> Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2010 20:35:12 -0500 To: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org> Cc: North American Network Operators Group <nanog@nanog.org> Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org On Dec 1, 2010, at 8:18 42PM, David Conrad wrote: > On Dec 1, 2010, at 11:41 AM, Randy Bush wrote: >> the more i think about this, the more i am inclined to consider a = second >> trusted root not (easily) attackable by the usg, who owns the root = now, >> or the acta vigilantes. as dissent becomes less tolerated, let alone >> supported, we may want to attempt to ensure it in our deployments. >=20 > Wouldn't this simply change the focus of who can attack from the USG = (which, as far as I am aware, has not attacked the root) to some other = government (or worse, the UN)? Given a handle, folks are going to want = to grab it when they feel a need to control, regardless of who the folks = are. It'd be nice to remove the handle, but that appears to be a very = hard problem... >=20 I think that the Pirate Bay announcement was triggered by http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=3D131678432 plus = the COICA bill (http://www.eff.org/coica) -- though it, at least, appears to be dead for this session and who knows what the new Congress will do. That said, I think the problem is primarily political, not technical. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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