[125727] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: [Re: http://tools.ietf.org/search/draft-hain-ipv6-ulac-01]
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu)
Wed Apr 21 21:38:34 2010
To: Mark Smith <nanog@85d5b20a518b8f6864949bd940457dc124746ddc.nosense.org>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 22 Apr 2010 07:30:51 +0930."
<20100422073051.624e1ab8@opy.nosense.org>
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2010 21:35:28 -0400
Cc: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
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On Thu, 22 Apr 2010 07:30:51 +0930, Mark Smith said:
> " The following table shows the probability of a collision for a range
> of connections using a 40-bit Global ID field.
>
> Connections Probability of Collision
>
> 2 1.81*10^-12
> 10 4.54*10^-11
> 100 4.54*10^-09
> 1000 4.54*10^-07
> 10000 4.54*10^-05
>
> Based on this analysis, the uniqueness of locally generated Global
> IDs is adequate for sites planning a small to moderate amount of
> inter-site communication using locally generated Global IDs."
There is a measured rate by RIRs and the like on the order of 10^-6 for
accidentally issuing duplicate integers (roughly approximated by 2 cases of
duplicate ASNs out of (300K routes + 30K ASNs). In other words, unless you
have over 1,000 or so backdoor links, you're more likely to get screwed over by
an administrative drone fscking up your paperwork than you are of a statistical
collision.
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