[122053] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: lawful intercept/IOS at BlackHat DC, bypassing and
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Christopher Morrow)
Thu Feb 4 17:42:40 2010
In-Reply-To: <4B6AD909.33E4.0097.0@globalstar.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 17:42:14 -0500
From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
To: Crist Clark <Crist.Clark@globalstar.com>
Cc: NANOG <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Crist Clark <Crist.Clark@globalstar.com> wr=
ote:
>> this seems like much more work that matt blaze's work that said:
> "Just
>> send more than 10mbps toward what you want to sneak around... the
>> LEA's pipe is saturated so nothing of use gets to them"
>
> The Cross/XForce/IBM talk appears more to be about unauthorized
> access to communications via LI rather than evading them,
>
> =A0"...there is a risk that [LI tools] could be hijacked by third
> =A0 parties and used to perform surveillance without authorization."
>
> Of course, this has already happened,
right... plus the management (for cisco) is via snmp(v3), from
(mostly) windows servers as the mediation devices (sad)... and the
traffic is simply tunneled from device -> mediation -> lea .... not
necessarily IPSEC'd from mediation -> LEA, and udp-encapped from
device -> mediation server.
> =A0http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_telephone_tapping_case_2004-2005
yea, good times... that's really just re-use of the normal LEA hooks
in all telco phone switch gear though... not 'calea features' in
particular.
-chris
