[120604] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Revisiting the Aviation Safety vs. Networking discussion
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Owen DeLong)
Mon Dec 28 15:29:08 2009
From: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
In-Reply-To: <f1dedf9c0912242308s73d72bcg9180398b9c14a776@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:24:35 -0800
To: Scott Howard <scott@doc.net.au>
Cc: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Dec 24, 2009, at 11:08 PM, Scott Howard wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 24, 2009 at 6:27 PM, George Bonser <gbonser@seven.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>> So you can put a lot of process around changes in advance but there
>> isn't quite as much to manage incidents that strike out of the clear
>> blue. Too much process at that point could impede progress in =
clearing
>> the issue. Capt. Sullenberger did not need to fill out an incident
>> report, bring up a conference bridge, and give a detailed description =
of
>> what was happening with his plane, the status of all subsystems, and =
his
>> proposed plan of action (subject to consensus of those on the =
conference
>> bridge) and get approval for deviation from his initial flight plan
>> before he took the required actions to land the plane as best as he
>> could under the circumstances.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> "*mayday mayday mayday. **Cactus fifteen thirty nine hit birds, we've =
lost
> thrust (in/on) both engines we're turning back towards LaGuardia*" - =
Capt.
> Sullenberger
>=20
> Not exactly "detailed", but he definitely initiated an "incident =
report"
> (the mayday), gave a "description of what was happening with his =
plane", the
> "status of [the relevant] subsystems", and his proposed plan of action =
-
> even in the order you've asked for!
>=20
Exactly.
> His actions were then "subject to the consensus of those on the =
conference
> bridge" (ie, ATC) who could have denied his actions if they believed =
they
> would have made the situation worse (ie, if what they were proposing =
would
> have had them on a collision course with another plane). In this case, =
the
> conference bridge gave approval for his course of action ("*ok uh, you =
need
> to return to LaGuardia? turn left heading of uh two two zero.*" - ATC)
>=20
Not exactly. If the others on the bridge don't consent, FAR 91.3 gives =
him
full and absolute authority to tell them to screw themselves and do what =
he
feels is best.
FAR 91.3 reads:
Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible =
for, and is the final
authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.
(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the =
pilot in command may
deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to =
meet that emergency.
(c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under =
paragraph (b) of this
section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a =
written report of that
deviation to the Administrator.
As near as I can tell, that regulation was last modified in 1963.
> 5 seconds before they made the above call they were reaching for the =
QRH
> (Quick Reference Handbook), which contains checklists of the steps to =
take
> in such a situation - including what to do in the event of loss of =
both
> engines due to multiple birdstrikes. They had no need to confer with =
others
> as to what actions to take to try and recover from the problem, or =
what
> order to take them in, because that pre-work had already been carried =
out
> when the check-lists were written.
>=20
Yep.
> Of course, at the end of the day, training, skill and experience =
played a
> very large part in what transpired - but so did the actions of the =
people on
> the "conference bridge" (You can't get much more of a "conference =
bridge"
> than open radio frequencies), and the checklists they have for almost =
every
> conceivable situation.
>=20
And in case there are any misconceptions here on the list, I know that =
in the
public eye, there is often a lot of distrust and/or perceived animosity =
between
controllers and pilots. Frankly, this is a misconception for the most =
part. Sure,
there are incidents where pilots and controllers don't get along, each =
blaming
the other. However, by and large, both groups are consummate =
professionals
doing their best to make sure flights end well. In my years as a pilot, =
I have
had more than one occasion to be very thankful for ATC and the services =
they
provide. Generally, they are a very helpful and hardworking group. I =
respect
them greatly and appreciate the tough job they do.
Owen
(Commercial Pilot, ASEL, Instrument Airplane)
=20=
