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Re: ISP port blocking practice

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (a.harrowell@gmail.com)
Sat Oct 24 05:28:12 2009

From: a.harrowell@gmail.com
To: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2009 10:27:28 +0100
Cc: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
Reply-To: a.harrowell@gmail.com
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org



-original message-
Subject: Re: ISP port blocking practice
From: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
Date: 24/10/2009 4:00 am

Yes.

Owen

On Oct 23, 2009, at 2:19 PM, Lee Riemer wrote:

> Isn't blocking any port against the idea of Net Neutrality?
>

Only if you take a legalistic view of it. Too much of the NN debate is =
about the futile search for an infallible legal argument with no corner =
cases. This is silly.

Take an empirical, practical view instead. Obviously there is no objection =
to blocking spam going out; after all, the spam comes from machines that =
are no longer under the control of their owners, so the only free speech =
that is affected is that of the spammer, and hasn't that already been =
litigated?

Free speech doesn't include the freedom to shout fire in a crowded theatre. =
Neither does it include the freedom to carry out a DDOS on the fire brigade =
control room. You aren't allowed to levy a toll on the roads and except =
your mates - roads are neutral. But that doesn't invalidate the speed limit =
or the obligation to drive on the left.

> Justin Shore wrote:
>> Owen DeLong wrote:
>>> Blocking ports that the end user has not asked for is bad.
>>
>> I was going to ask for a clarification to make sure I read your  =

>> statement correctly but then again it's short enough I really don't  =

>> see any room to misinterpret it.  Do you seriously think that a  =

>> typical residential user has the required level of knowledge to  =

>> call their SP and ask for them to block tcp/25, tcp & udp/1433 and  =

>> 1434, and a whole list of common open proxy ports?  While they're  =

>> at it they might ask the SP to block the C&C ports for Bobax and  =

>> Kraken.  I'm sure all residential users know that they use ports  =

>> 447 and 13789.  If so then send me some of your users.  You must be  =

>> serving users around the MIT campus.
>>
>>> Doing it and refusing to unblock is worse.
>>
>> How you you propose we pull a customer's dynamically-assigned IP  =

>> out of a DHCP pool so we can treat it differently?  Not all SPs use  =

>> customer-facing AUTH.  I can think of none that do for CATV though  =

>> I'm sure someone will now point an oddball SP that I've never heard  =

>> of before.
>>
>>> Some ISPs have the even worse practice of blocking 587 and a few  =

>>> even
>>> go to the horrible length to block 465.
>>
>> I would call that a very bad practice.  I haven't personally seen a  =

>> mis-configured MTA listening on the MSP port so I don't think they  =

>> can make he claim that the MSP port is a common security risk.  I  =

>> would call tcp/587 a very safe port to have traverse my network.  I  =

>> think those ISPs are either demonstrating willful ignorance or =20
>> marketing malice.
>>
>>> A few hotel gateways I have encountered are dumb enough to think  =

>>> they can block TCP/53
>>> which is always fun.
>>
>> The hotel I stayed in 2 weeks ago that housed a GK class I took had  =

>> just such a proxy.  It screwed up DNS but even worse it completely  =

>> hosed anything trying to tunnel over HTTP.  OCS was dead in the  =

>> water.  My RPC-over-HTTP Outlook client couldn't work either.  =20
>> Fortunately they didn't mess with IPSec VPN or SSH.  Either way it  =

>> didn't matter much since the network was unusable (12 visible APs  =

>> from room, all on overlapping 802.11b/g channels).  The average  =

>> throughput was .02Mbps.
>>
>>> Lovely for you, but, not particularly helpful to your customers  =

>>> who may actually want to use some of those services.
>>
>> I take a hard line on this.  I will not let the technical ignorance  =

>> of the average residential user harm my other customers.  There is  =

>> absolutely no excuse for using Netbios or MS-SQL over the Internet  =

>> outside of an encrypted tunnel.  Any user smart enough to use a  =

>> proxy is smart enough to pick a non-default port.  Any residential  =

>> user running a proxy server locally is in violation of our AUP =20
>> anyway and will get warned and then terminated.  My filtering helps  =

>> 99.99% of my userbase. The .001% that find this basic security =20
>> filter intolerable can speak with their wallets.  They can find  =

>> themselves another provider if they want to use those ports or pay  =

>> for a business circuit where we filter very little on the =20
>> assumption they as a business have the technical competence to =20
>> handle basic security on their own.  (The actual percentage of =20
>> users that have raised concerns in the past 3 years is .0008%.  I  =

>> spoke with each of them and none decided to leave our service.)
>>
>> We've been down the road of no customer-facing ingress ACLs.  We've  =

>> fought the battles of getting large swaths of IPs blacklisted =20
>> because of a few users' technical incompetence.  We've had large  =

>> portions of our network null-routed in large SPs.  Then we got our  =

>> act together and stopped acting like those ISPs who we all love to  =

>> bitch about, that do not manage their customer traffic, and are  =

>> poor netizens of this shared resource we call the Internet.  Our  =

>> problems have all but gone away. Our residential and business users  =

>> no longer call in on a daily basis to report blacklisting =20
>> problems.  We no longer have reachability issues with networks that  =

>> got fed up with the abuse coming from our compromised users and  =

>> null-routed us.  I stand by our results as proof that what we're  =

>> doing is right.  Our customers seem to agree and that's what =
matters.
>>
>> Justin
>>
>>
>>





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