[107559] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: an effect of ignoring BCP38
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (k claffy)
Sat Sep 6 09:49:37 2008
Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2008 06:49:05 -0700
From: k claffy <kc@caida.org>
To: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
In-Reply-To: <20080905052227.GA8309@vacation.karoshi.com.>
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
do that many networks really allow spoofing? i used
to think so, based on hearsay, but rob beverly's
http://spoofer.csail.mit.edu/summary.php suggests
things are a lot better than they used to be, arbor's
last survey echos same. are rob's numbers inconsistent
with numbers anyone else believes to be true?
i think you unfairly characterize UW's work,
but i also think you make questionable inferences
regarding the extent of spoofing, which seems more
relevant to nanog.
k
On Fri, Sep 05, 2008 at 05:22:27AM +0000, bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote:
seems that some folks in the R&E community, with institutional support
from Cisco, Google, and the US NSF, are exploiting our inability to
take even rudimentary steps toward providing a level of integrity in
routing by teaching students that spoofing IP space is ok. This whole
thing works at all because so few people use/deploy/maintain BCP-38
compliance. This was an eye-opener for me.
http://www.caida.org/workshops/wide/0808/slides/measuring_reverse_paths.pdf
--bill
