[107454] in North American Network Operators' Group

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daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Keith Medcalf)
Wed Sep 3 20:39:29 2008

Date: Wed, 03 Sep 2008 20:34:12 -0400
From: "Keith Medcalf" <kmedcalf@dessus.com>
To: "nanog@nanog.org" <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org

 
> On Wed, Sep 03, 2008 at 12:58:53PM -0400, Nicholas Suan wrote:
> > On Sep 3, 2008, at 12:49 PM, Jay R. Ashworth wrote:

> > >You're forgetting that 587 *is authenticated, always*.

> > I'm not sure how that makes much of a difference since the 
> > usual spam vector is malware that has (almost) complete 
> > control of the machine in the first place.

> Well, that depends on MUA design, of course, but it's just 
> been pointed out to me that the RFC says MAY, not MUST. 

> Oops.

> Does anyone bother to run an MSA on 587 and *not* require 
> authentication?

Raises hand.

Why would the requirements for authentication be different depending on the=
 port used to connect to the MTA?

No matter how a session comes into the MTA (port 25, 465, 587, anything els=
e) and no matter whether it is encrypted or not, the requirement for authen=
tication (which is always available and advertized), is based on a simple p=
olicy:  

 - local delivery originating from a non-blacklisted or "internal/customer"=
 address does not require authentication; 

 - relay from "internal/customer" IP Addresses does not require authenticat=
ion;

 - any connection from a blacklisted IP requires authentication or no mail =
will be accepted;

 - relay from "external/non-customer" IP Addresses requires authentication;

Is there a valid reason why a different configuration is justified?

As an aside, outbound port 25 traffic is also blocked except from the MTA.





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