[107245] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Revealed: The Internet's well known BGP behavior
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Anton Kapela)
Thu Aug 28 11:16:26 2008
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2008 10:16:16 -0500
From: "Anton Kapela" <tkapela@gmail.com>
To: NANOG <nanog@merit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <A0EF80F9-3DBE-44C9-8729-93932E3D4406@ianai.net>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
I thought I'd toss in a few comments, considering it's my fault that
few people are understanding this thing yet.
>> On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 2:28 PM, Gadi Evron <ge@linuxbox.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> People (especially spammers) have been hijacking networks for a while
I'd like to 'clear the air' here. Clearly, I failed at Defcon, WIRED,
AFP, and Forbes.
We all know sub-prefix hijacking is not news. What is news? Using
as-path loop detection to selectively blackhole the hijacked route -
which creates a transport path _back to_ the target.
That's all it is, nothing more. All but the WIRED follow-up article
missed this point *completely.* They over-represented the 'hijacking'
aspects, while only making mention of the 'interception' potential.
Lets end this thread with the point I had intended two weeks ago:
we've presented a method by which all the theory spewed by academics
can be actualized in a real network (the big-I internet) to effect
interception of data between (nearly) arbitrary endpoints from
(nearly) any edge or stub AS. That, I think, is interesting.
-Tk
