[102691] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: YouTube IP Hijacking
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Owen DeLong)
Sun Feb 24 23:25:01 2008
Cc: "Simon Lockhart" <simon@slimey.org>, "Michael Smith" <msmith@internap.com>,
<neil.fenemor@fx.net.nz>, <will@harg.net>, <nanog@merit.edu>
From: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
To: "Tomas L. Byrnes" <tomb@byrneit.net>
In-Reply-To: <70D072392E56884193E3D2DE09C097A9EF10@pascal.zaphodb.org>
Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2008 20:24:44 -0800
Errors-To: owner-nanog@merit.edu
On Feb 24, 2008, at 2:14 PM, Tomas L. Byrnes wrote:
>
> I figured as much, but it was worth a try.
>
> Which touches on the earlier discussion of the null routing of /32s
> advertised by a special AS (as a means of black-holing DDOS traffic).
>
> It seems to me that a more immediately germane matter regarding BGP
> route propagation is prevention of hijacking of critical routes.
>
> Perhaps certain ASes that are considered "high priority", like Google,
> YouTube, Yahoo, MS (at least their update servers), can be trusted to
> propagate routes that are not aggregated/filtered, so as to give them
> control over their reachability and immunity to longer-prefix
> hijacking
> (especially problematic with things like MS update sites).
>
>
That's just inviting the injection of forged AS routes to commit
abuse.
Owen
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Simon Lockhart [mailto:simon@slimey.org]
>> Sent: Sunday, February 24, 2008 2:07 PM
>> To: Tomas L. Byrnes
>> Cc: Michael Smith; neil.fenemor@fx.net.nz; will@harg.net;
>> nanog@merit.edu
>> Subject: Re: YouTube IP Hijacking
>>
>> On Sun Feb 24, 2008 at 01:49:00PM -0800, Tomas L. Byrnes wrote:
>>> Which means that, by advertising routes more specific than the ones
>>> they are poisoning, it may well be possible to restore universal
>>> connectivity to YouTube.
>>
>> Well, if you can get them in there.... Youtube tried that, to
>> restore service to the rest of the world, and the
>> announcements didn't propogate.
>>
>> Simon
>>
