[87964] in Discussion of MIT-community interests
4 Things Happen Before You Die From A Heart Attack
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Heart Attack Fighter)
Fri Sep 2 11:10:18 2016
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 13:02:54 -0400
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To: <mit-talk-mtg@charon.mit.edu>
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<p>4 Things Happen Before You Die From A Heart Attack<br /> But some one=
will say, if these are the principles of the trial by jury, then it is pla=
in that justice must often fail to be done. Admitting, for the sake of the =
argument, that this may be true, the compensation for it is, that positive =
injustice will also often fail to be done; whereas otherwise it would be do=
ne frequently. The very precautions used to prevent injustice being done, m=
ay often have the effect to prevent justice being done. Bu are we, therefor=
e, to take no precautions against injustice? By no means, all will agree. T=
he question then arises Does the trial by jury, as here explained, involve =
such extreme and unnecessary precautions against injustice, as to interpose=
unnecessary obstacles to the doing of justice? Men of different minds may =
very likely answer this question differently, according as they have more o=
r less confidence in the wisdom and justice of legislators, the integrity a=
nd independence of judges, and the intelligence of jurors. This much, howev=
er, may be said in favor of these precautions, viz., that the history of th=
e past, as well as our constant present experience, prove how much injustic=
e may, and certainly will, be done, systematically and continually, for the=
want of these precautions that is, while the law is authoritatively made a=
nd expounded by legislators and judges. On the other hand, we have no such =
evidence of how much justice may fail to be done, by reason of these precau=
tions that is, by reason of the law being left to the judgments and conscie=
nces of jurors. We can determine the former point that is, how much positiv=
e injustice is done under the first of these two systems because the system=
is in full operation; but we cannot determine how much justice would fail =
to be done under the latter system, because we have, in modern times, had n=
o experience of the use of the precautions themselves. In ancient times, wh=
en these precautions were nominally in force, such was the tyranny of kings=
, and such the poverty, ignorance, and the inability of concert and resista=
nce, on the part of the people, that the system had no full or fair operati=
on. It, nevertheless, under all these disadvantages, impressed itself upon =
the understandings, and imbedded itself in the hearts, of the people, so as=
no other system of civil liberty has ever done. But this view of the two s=
ystems compares only the injustice done, and the justice omitted to be done=
, in the individual cases adjudged, without looking beyond them. And some p=
ersons might, on first thought, argue that, if justice failed of being done=
under the one system, oftener than positive injustice were done under the =
other, the balance was in favor of the latter system. But such a weighing o=
f the two systems against each other gives no true idea of their comparativ=
e merits or demerits; for, possibly, in this view alone, the balance would =
not be very great in favor of either. To compare, or rather to contrast, th=
e two, we must consider that, under the jury system, the failures to do jus=
tice would be only rare and exceptional cases; and would be owing either to=
the intrinsic difficulty of the questions, or to the fact that the parties=
had. transacted their business in a manner unintelligible to the jury, and=
the effects would be confined to the individual or individuals interested =
in the particular suits. No permanent law would be established thereby dest=
ructive of the rights of the people in other like cases. And the people at =
large would continue to enjoy all their natural rights as before. But under=
the other system, whenever an unjust law is enacted by the legislature, an=
d the judge imposes it upon the jury as authoritative, and they give a judg=
ment in accordance therewith, the authority of the law is thereby establish=
ed, and the whole people are thus brought under the yoke of that law; becau=
se they then understand that the law will be enforced against them in futur=
e, if they presume to exercise their rights, or refuse to comply with the e=
xactions of the law. In this manner all unjust laws are established, and ma=
de operative against the rights of the people. The difference, then, betwee=
n the two systems is this: Under the one system, a jury, at distant interva=
ls, would (not enforce any positive injustice, but only) fail of enforcing =
justice, in a dark and difficult case, or in consequence of the parties not=
having transacted their business in a manner intelligible to a jury; and t=
he plaintiff would thus fail of obtaining what was rightfully due him. And =
there the matter would end, for evil, though not for good; for thenceforth =
parties, warned, of the danger of losing their rights, would be careful to =
transact their business in a more clear and intelligible manner. Under the =
other system the system of legislative and judicial authority positive inju=
stice is not only done in every suit arising under unjust laws, that is, me=
n's property, liberty, or lives are not only unjustly taken on those partic=
ular judgments, but the rights of the whole people are struck down by the a=
uthority of the laws thus enforced, and a wide-sweeping tyranny at once put=
in operation. But there is another ample and conclusive answer to the argu=
ment that justice would often fail to be done, if jurors were allowed to be=
governed by their own consciences, instead of the direction of the justice=
s, in matters of law. That answer is this: Legitimate government can be for=
med only by the voluntary association of all who contribute to its support.=
As a voluntary association, it can have for its objects only those things =
in which the members of the association are all agreed. If, therefore, ther=
e be any justice, in regard to which all the parties to the government are =
not agreed, the objects of the association do not extend to it. If any =
of the members wish more than this, if they claim to have acquired a more e=
xtended knowledge of justice than is common to all, and wish to have their =
pretended discoveries carried into effect, in reference to themselves, they=
must either form a separate association for that purpose, or be content to=
wait until they can make their views intelligible to the people at large. =
They cannot claim or expect that the whole people shall practise the folly =
of taking on trust their pretended superior knowledge, and of committing bl=
indly into their hands all their own interests, liberties, and rights, to b=
e disposed of on principles, the justness of which the people themselves ca=
nnot comprehend. A government of the whole, therefore, must necessarily con=
fine itself to the administration of such principles of law as all the peop=
le, who contribute to the support of the government, can comprehend and see=
the justice of. And it can be confined within those limits only by allowin=
g the jurors, who represent all the parties to the compact, to judge of the=
law, and the justice of the law, in all cases whatsoever. And if any justi=
ce be left undone, under these circumstances, it is a justice for which the=
nature of the association does not provide, which the association does not=
undertake to do, and which, as an association, it is under no obligation t=
o do. The people at large, the unlearned and common people, have certainly =
an indisputable right to associate for the establishment and maintenance of=
such a government as they themselves see the justice of, and feel the need=
of, for the promotion of their own interests, and the safety of their own =
rights, without at the same time surrendering all their property, liberty, =
and rights into the hands of men, who, under the pretence of a superior and=
incomprehensible knowledge of justice, may dispose of such property, liber=
ties, and rights, in a manner to suit their own selfish and dishonest purpo=
ses. If a government were to be established and supported solely by that po=
rtion of the people who lay claim to superior knowledge, there would be som=
e consistency in their saying that the common people should not be received=
as jurors, with power to judge of the justice of the laws. But so long as =
the whole people (or all the male adults) are presumed to be voluntary part=
ies to the government, and voluntary contributors to it support, there is n=
o consistency in refusing to any one of them more than to another the right=
to sit as juror, with full power to decide for himself whether any law tha=
t is proposed to be enforced in any particular case, be within the objects =
of the association. The conclusion, therefore, is, that, in a government fo=
rmed by voluntary association, or on the theory of voluntary association, a=
nd voluntary support, (as all the North American governments are,) no law c=
an rightfully be enforced by the association in its corporate capacity, aga=
inst the goods, rights, or person of any individual, except it be such as a=
ll the members of the association agree that it may enforce. To enforce any=
other law, to the extent of taking a man's goods, rights, or person, would=
be making some of the parties to the association accomplices in what they =
regard as acts of injustice. It would also be making them consent to what t=
hey regard as the destruction of their own rights. These are things which n=
o legitimate system or theory of government can require of any of the parti=
es to it. The mode adopted, by the trial by jury, for ascertaining whether =
all the parties to the government do approve of a particular law, is to tak=
e twelve men at random from the whole people, and accept their unanimous de=
cision as representing the opinions of the whole. Even this mode is not the=
oretically accurate; for theoretical accuracy would require that every man,=
who was a party to the government, should individually give his consent to=
the enforcement of every law in every separate case. But such a thing woul=
d be impossible in practice. The consent of twelve men is therefore taken i=
nstead; with-the privilege of appeal, and (in case of error found by the ap=
peal court) a new trial, to guard against possible mistakes. This system, i=
t is assumed, will ascertain the sense of the whole people "the countr=
y" with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes, and with as mu=
ch accuracy as is practicable without too great inconvenience and expense. =
5. Another objection that will perhaps be made to allowing jurors to judge =
of the law, and the justice of the law, is, that the law would be uncertain=
If, by this objection, it be meant that the law would be uncertain to the=
minds of the people at large, so that they would not know what the juries =
would sanction and what condemn, and would not therefore know practically w=
hat their own rights and liberties were under the law, the objection is tho=
roughly baseless and false. No system of law that was ever devised could be=
so entirely intelligible and certain to the minds of the people at large a=
s this. Compared with it, the complicated systems of law that are compounde=
d of the law of nature, of constitutional grants, of innumerable and incess=
antly changing legislative enactments, and of countless and contradictory j=
udicial decisions, with no uniform principle of reason or justice running t=
hrough them, are among the blindest of all the mazes in which unsophisticat=
ed minds were ever bewildered and lost. The uncertainty of the law under th=
ese systems has become a proverb. So great is this uncertainty, that nearly=
all men, learned as well as unlearned, shun the law as their enemy, instea=
d of resorting to it for protection. They usually go into courts of justice=
, so called, only as men go into battle when there is no alternative left f=
or them. And even then they go into them as men go into dark labyrinths and=
caverns with no knowledge of their own, but trusting wholly to their guide=
s. Yet, less fortunate than other adventurers, they can have little confide=
nce even in their guides, for the reason that the guides themselves know li=
ttle of the mazes they are threading. They know the mode and place of entra=
nce; but what they will meet with on their way, and what will be the time, =
mode, place, or condition of their exit; whether they will emerge into a pr=
ison, or not; whether wholly naked and destitute, or not; whether with thei=
r reputations left to them, or not; and whether in time or eternity; experi=
enced and honest guides rarely venture to predict. Was there ever such fatu=
ity as that of a nation of men madly bent on building up such labyrinhs as =
these, for no other purpose than that of exposing all their rights of reput=
ation, property, liberty, and life, to the hazards of being lost in them, i=
nstead of being content to live in the light of the open day of their own u=
nderstandings? What honest, unsophisticated man ever found himself involved=
in a lawsuit, that he did not desire, of all things, that his cause might =
be judged of on principles of natural justice, as those principles were und=
erstood by plain men like himself? He would then feel that he could foresee=
the result. These plain men are the men who pay the taxes, and support the=
government. Why should they not have such an administration of justice as =
they desire, and can understand? If the jurors were to judge of the law, an=
d the justice of the law, there would be something like certainty in the ad=
ministration of justice, and in the popular knowledge of the law, and men w=
ould govern themselves accordingly. There would be something like certainty=
, because every man has himself something like definite and clear opinions,=
and also knows something of the opinions of his neighbors, on matters of j=
ustice. And he would know that no statute, unless it were so clearly just a=
s to command the unanimous assent of twelve men, who should be taken at ran=
dom from the whole community, could be enforced so as to take from him his =
reputation, property, liberty, or life. What greater certainty can men requ=
ire or need, as to the laws under which they are to live? If a statute were=
enacted by a legislature, a man, in order to know what was its true interp=
retation, whether it were constitutional, and whether it would be enforced,=
would not be under the necessity of waiting for years until some suit had =
arisen and been carried through all the stages of judicial proceeding, to a=
final decision. He would need only to use his own reason as to its meaning=
and its justice, and then talk with his neighbors on the same points. Unle=
ss he found them nearly unanimous in their interpretation and approbation o=
f it, he would conclude that juries would not unite in enforcing it, and th=
at it would consequently be a dead letter. And he would be safe in coming t=
o this conclusion. There would be something like certainty in the administr=
ation of justice, and in the popular knowledge of the law, for the further =
reason that there would be little legislation, and men's rights would be le=
ft to stand almost solely upon the law of nature, or what was once called i=
n England "the common law," (before so much legislation and usurp=
ation had become incorporated into the common law,) in other words, upon th=
e principles of natural justice. Of the certainty of this law of nature, or=
the ancient English common law, I may be excused for repeating here what, =
I have said on another occasion. "Natural law, so far from being uncer=
tain, when compared with statutory and constitutional law, is the only thin=
g that gives any certainty at all to a very large portion of our statutory =
and constitutional law. The reason is this. The words in which statutes and=
constitutions are written are susceptible of so many different meanings, m=
eanings widely different from, often directly opposite to, each other, in t=
heir bearing upon men's rights, that, unless there were some rule of interp=
retation for determining which of these various and opposite meanings are t=
he true ones, there could be no certainty at all as to the meaning of the s=
tatutes and constitutions themselves. Judges could make almost anything the=
y should please out of them. Hence the necessity of a rule of interpretatio=
n. And this rule is, that the language of statutes and constitutions shall =
be construed, as nearly as possible, consistently with natural law. The rul=
e assumes, what is true, that natural law is a thing certain in itself; als=
o that it is capable of being learned. It assumes, furthermore, that it act=
ually is understood by the legislators and judges who make and interpret th=
e written law. Of necessity, therefore, it assumes further, that they (the =
legislators and judges) are incompetent to make and interpret the written l=
aw, unless they previously understand the natural law applicable to the sam=
e subject. It also assumes that the people must understand the natural law,=
before they can understated the written law. It is a principle perfectly f=
amiliar to lawyers, and one that must be perfectly obvious to every other m=
an that will reflect a moment, that, as a general rule, no one can know wha=
t the written law is, until he knows what it ought to be; that men are liab=
le to be constantly misled by the various and conflicting senses of the sam=
e words, unless they perceive the true legal sense in which the words ought=
to be taken. And this true legal sense is the sense that is most nearly co=
nsistent with natural law of any that the words can be made to bear, consis=
tently with the laws of language, and appropriately to the subjects to whic=
h they are applied. Though the words contain the law, the words themselves =
are not the law. Were the words themselves the law, each single written law=
would be liable to embrace many different laws, to wit, as many different =
laws as there were different senses, and different combinations of senses, =
in which each and all the words were capable of being taken. Take, for exam=
ple, the Constitution of the United States. By adopting one or another sens=
e of the single word "free," the whole instrument is changed. Yet=
the word free is capable of some ten or twenty different senses. So that, =
by changing the sense of that single word, some ten or twenty different con=
stitutions could be made out of the same written instrument. But there are,=
we will suppose, a thousand other words in the constitution, each of which=
is capable of from two to ten different senses. So that, by changing the s=
ense of only a single word at a time, several thousands of different consti=
tutions would be made. But this is not all. Variations could also be made b=
y changing the senses of two or more words at a time, and these variations =
could be run through all the changes and combinations of senses that these =
thousand words are capable of. We see, then, that it is no more than a lite=
ral truth, that out of that single instrument, as it now stands, without al=
tering the location of a single word, might be formed, by construction and =
interpretation, more different constitutions than figures can well estimate=
But each written law, in order to be a law, must be taken only in some on=
e definite and distinct sense; and that definite and distinct sense must be=
selected from the almost infinite variety of senses which its words are ca=
pable of. How is this selection to be made? It can be only by the aid of th=
at perception of natural law, or natural justice, which men naturally posse=
ss. Such, then, is the comparative certainty of the natural and the written=
law. Nearly all the certainty there is in the latter, so far as it relates=
to principles, is based upon, and derived from, the still greater certaint=
y of the former. In fact, nearly all the uncertainty of the laws under whic=
h we live, which are a mixture of natural and written laws, arises from the=
difficulty of construing, or, rather, from the facility of misconstruing, =
the written law; while natural law has nearly or quite the same certainty a=
s mathematics. On this point, Sir William Jones, one of the most learned ju=
dges that have ever lived, learned in Asiatic as well as European law, says=
, and the fact should be kept forever in mind, as one of the most important=
of all truths: "It is pleasing to remark, the similarity, or, rather,=
the identity of those conclusions which pure, unbiased reason, in all ages=
; and nations, seldom fails to draw, in such juridical inquiries as are not=
fettered and manacled by positive institutions." In short, the si=
mple fact that the written law must be interpreted by the natural, is, of i=
tself, a sufficient confession of the superior certainty of the latter. The=
written law, then, even where it can be construed consistently with the na=
tural, introduces labor and obscurity, instead of shutting them out. And th=
is must always be the case, because words do not create ideas, but only rec=
all them; and the same word may recall many different ideas. For this reaso=
n, nearly all abstract principles can be seen by the single mind more clear=
ly than they can be expressed by words to another. This is owing to the imp=
erfection of language, and the different senses, meanings, and shades of me=
aning, which different individuals attach to the same words, in the same ci=
rcumstances. Where the written law cannot be construed consistently wit=
h the natural, there is no reason why it should ever be enacted at all. It =
may, indeed, be sufficiently plain and certain to be easily understood; but=
its certainty and plainness are but a poor compensation for its injustice.=
Doubtless a law forbidding men to drink water, on pain of death, might be =
made so intelligible as to cut off all discussion as to its meaning; but wo=
uld the intelligibleness of such a law be any equivalent for the right to d=
rink water? The principle is the same in regard to all unjust laws. Few per=
sons could reasonably feel compensated for the arbitrary destruction of the=
ir rights, by having the order for their destruction made known beforehand,=
in terms so distinct and unequivocal as to admit of neither mistake nor ev=
asion. Yet this is all the compensation that such laws offer. Whether, ther=
efore, written laws correspond with, or differ from, the natural, they are =
to be condemned. In the first case, they are useless repetitions, introduci=
ng labor and obscurity. In the latter case, they are positive violations of=
men's rights. There would be substantially the same reason in enacting mat=
hematics by statute, that there is in enacting natural law. Whenever the na=
tural law is sufficiently certain to all men's minds to justify its being e=
nacted, it is sufficiently certain to need no enactment. On the other hand,=
until it be thus certain, there is danger of doing injustice by enacting i=
t; it should, therefore, be left open to be discussed by anybody who may be=
disposed to question it, and to be judged of by the proper tribunal, the j=
udiciary. It is not necessary that legislators should enact natural law=
in order that it may be known to the people, because that would be presumi=
ng that the legislators already understand it better than the people, a fac=
t of which I am not aware that they have ever heretofore given any very sat=
isfactory evidence. The same sources of knowledge on the subject are open t=
o the people that are open to the legislators, and the people must be presu=
med to know it as well as they. The objections made to natural law, on the =
ground of obscurity, are wholly unfounded. It is true, it must be learned, =
like any other science; but it is equally true that it is very easily learn=
ed. Although as illimitable in its applications as the infinite relations o=
f men to each other, it is, nevertheless, made up of simple elementary prin=
ciples, of the truth and justice of which every ordinary mind has an almost=
intuitive perception. It is the science of justice, and almost all men hav=
e the same perceptions of what constitutes justice, or of what justice requ=
ires, when they understand alike the facts from which their inferences are =
to be drawn. Men living in contact with each other, and having intercourse =
together, cannot avoid learning natural law, to a very great extent, even i=
f they would. The dealings of men with men, their separate possessions, and=
their individual wants, are continually forcing upon their minds the quest=
ions, Is this act just? or is it unjust? Is this thing mine? or is it his? =
And these are questions of natural law; questions, which, in regard to the =
great mass of cases, are answered alike by the human mind everywhere. Child=
ren learn many principles of natural law at a very early age. For example: =
they learn that when one child has picked up an apple or a flower, it is hi=
s, and that his associates must not take it from him against his will. They=
also learn that if he voluntarily exchange his apple or flower with a play=
mate, for some other article of desire, he has thereby surrendered his righ=
t to it, and must not reclaim it. These are fundamental principles of natur=
al law, which govern most of the greatest interests of individuals and soci=
ety; yet children learn them earlier than they learn that three and three a=
re six, or five and five, ten. Talk of enacting natural law by statute, tha=
t it may be known! It would hardly be extravagant to say, that, in nine cas=
es in ten, men learn it before they have learned the language by which we d=
escribe it. Nevertheless, numerous treatises are written on it, as on other=
sciences. The decisions of courts, containing their opinions upon the almo=
st endless variety of cases that have come before them, are reported; and t=
hese reports are condensed, codified, and digested, so as to give, in a sma=
ll compass, the facts, and the opinions of the courts as to the law resulti=
ng from them. And these treatises, codes, and digests are open to be read o=
f all men. And a man has the same excuse for being ignorant of arithmetic, =
or any other science, that he has for being ignorant of natural law. He can=
learn it as well, if he will, without its being enacted, as he could if it=
were. If our governments would but themselves adhere to natural law, there=
would be little occasion to complain of the ignorance of the people in reg=
ard to it. The popular ignorance of law is attributable mainly to the innov=
ations that have been made upon natural law by legislation; whereby our sys=
tem has become an incongruous mixture of natural and statute law, with no u=
niform principle pervading it. To learn such a system, if system it can be =
called, and if learned it can be, is a matter of very similar difficulty to=
what it would be to learn a system of mathematics, which should consist of=
the mathematics of nature, interspersed with such other mathematics as mig=
ht be created by legislation, in violation of all the natural principles of=
numbers and quantities. But whether the difficulties of learning natural l=
aw be greater or less than here represented, they exist in the nature of th=
ings, and cannot be removed. Legislation, instead of removing, only increas=
es them; This it does by innovating upon natural truths and principles, and=
introducing jargon and contradiction, in the place of order, analogy, cons=
istency, and uniformity. Further than this; legislation does not even profe=
ss to remove the obscurity of natural law. That is no part of its object. I=
t only professes to substitute something arbitrary in the place of natural =
law. Legislators generally have the sense to see that legislation will not =
make natural law any clearer than it is. Neither is it the object of legisl=
ation to establish the authority of natural law. Legislators have the sense=
to see that they can add nothing to the authority of natural law, and that=
it will stand on its own authority, unless they overturn it. The whole obj=
ect of legislation, excepting that legislation which merely makes regulatio=
ns, and provides instrumentalities for carrying other laws into effect, is =
to overturn natural law, and substitute for it the arbitrary will of power.=
In other words, the whole object of it is to destroy men's rights. At leas=
t, such is its only effect; and its designs must be inferred from its effec=
t. Taking all the statutes in the country, there probably is not one in a h=
undred, except the auxiliary ones just mentioned, that does not violate nat=
ural law; that does not invade some right or other. Yet the advocates of ar=
bitrary legislation are continually practising the fraud of pretending that=
unless the legislature make the laws, the laws will not be known. The whol=
e object of the fraud is to secure to the government the authority of makin=
g lawsthat never ought to be known." In addition to the authority alre=
ady cited, of Sir William Jones, as to the certainty of natural law, and th=
e uniformity of men's opinions in regard to it, I may add the following: &q=
uot;There is that great simplicity and plainness in the Common Law, that Lo=
rd Coke has gone so far as to assert, (and Lord Bacon nearly seconds him in=
observing,) that 'he never knew two questions arise merely upon common law=
; but that they were mostly owing to statutes ill-penned and overladen with=
provisos.' " 3 Eunomus, 157 8. If it still be said that juries would =
disagree, as to what was natural justice, and that one jury would decide on=
e way, and another jury another; the answer is, that such a thing is hardly=
credible, as that twelve men, taken at random from the people at large, sh=
ould unanimously decide a question of natural justice one way, and that twe=
lve other men, selected in the same manner, should unanimously decide the s=
ame question the other way, unless they were misled by the justices. If, ho=
wever, such things should sometimes happen, from any cause whatever, the re=
medy is by appeal, and new trial. Judges do not even live up to that pa=
rt of their own maxim, which requires jurors to try the matter of fact. By =
dictating to them the laws of evidence, that is, by dictating what evidence=
they may hear, and what they may not hear, and also by dictating to them r=
ules for weighing such evidence as they permit them to hear, they of necess=
ity dictate the conclusion to which they shall arrive. And thus the court r=
eally tries the question of fact, as well as the question of law, in every =
cause. It is clearly impossible, in the nature of things, for a jury to try=
, a question of fact, without trying every question of law on which the fac=
t depends. Most disagreements of juries are on matters of fact, which a=
re admitted to be within their province. We have little or no evidence of t=
heir disagreements on matters of natural justice. The disagreements of cour=
ts on matters of law, afford little or no evidence that juries would also d=
isagree on matters of law that is, of justice, because the disagreements of=
courts are generally on matters of legislation, and not on those principle=
s of abstract justice, by which juries would be governed, and in regard to =
which the minds of men are nearly unanimous. This is the principle of a=
ll voluntary associations whatsoever. No voluntary association was ever for=
med, and in the nature of things there never can be one formed, for the acc=
omplishment of any objects except those in which all the parties to the ass=
ociation are agreed. Government, therefore, must be kept within these limit=
s, or it is no longer a voluntary association of all who contribute to its =
support, but a mere tyrant established by a part over the rest. All, or nea=
rly all, voluntary associations give to a majority, or to some other portio=
n of the members less than the whole, the right to use some limited discret=
ion as to themeans to be used to accomplish the ends in view; but the end t=
hemselves to be accomplished are always precisely defined, and are such as =
every member necessarily agrees to, else he would not voluntarily join the =
association. Justice is the object of government, and those who support the=
government, must be agreed as to the justice to be executed by it, or they=
cannot rightfully unite in maintaining the government itself. Jones on=
Bailments, Kent, describing the difficulty of construing the written l=
aw, says: "Such is the imperfection of language, and the want of techn=
ical skill in the makers of the law, that statutes often give occasion to t=
he most perplexing and distressing doubts and discussions, arising from the=
ambiguity that attends them. It requires great experience, as well as the =
command of a perspicuous diction, to frame a law in such clear and precise =
terms, as to secure it from ambiguous expressions, and from all doubts and =
criticisms upon its meaning " Kent, 460. The following extract from a =
speech of Lord Brougham, in the House of Lords, confesses the same difficul=
ty: There was another subject, well worthy of the consideration of governme=
nt during the recess, the expediency, or rather the absolute necessity, of =
some arrangement for the preparation of bills, not merely private, but publ=
ic bills, in order that legislation might be consistent and systematic, and=
that the courts might not have so large a portion of their time occupied i=
n endeavoring to construe acts of Parliament, in many cases unconstruable, =
and in most cases difficult to be construed." Law Reporter, 1848, p. 5=
25. This condemnation of written laws must, of course, be understood as=
applying only to cases where principles and rights are involved, and not a=
s condemning any governmental arrangements, or instrumentalities, that are =
consistent with natural right, and which must be agreed upon for the purpos=
e of carrying natural law into effect. These things may be varied, as exped=
iency may dictate, so only that they be allowed to infringe no principle of=
justice. And they must, of course, be written, because they do not exist a=
s fixed principles, or laws in nature.</p>=20
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