[87168] in Discussion of MIT-community interests
Why Pay Full Price For Printer Ink?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Printer Ink)
Sun Aug 21 11:43:46 2016
Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2016 11:37:20 -0400
From: "Printer Ink" <printer.ink@hkewn.com>
To: <mit-talk-mtg@charon.mit.edu>
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<p align=3D"right"><span style=3D"color: #FFFFFF; ">What would history=
be without the picturesque annals of the Gallic race? This is a question w=
hich the serious student may well ask himself as he works his way through t=
he chronicles of a dozen centuries. From the age of Charlemagne to the last=
of the Bonapartes is a long stride down the ages; but there was never a ti=
me in all these years when men might make reckonings in the arithmetic of E=
uropean politics without taking into account the prestige, the power, and e=
ven the primacy of France. There were times without number when France amon=
g her neighbours made herself hated with an undying hate; there were times,=
again, when she rallied them to her side in friendship and admiration. The=
re were epochs in which her hegemony passed unquestioned among men of other=
lands, and there were times when a sudden shift in fortune seemed to lay t=
he nation prostrate, with none so poor to do her reverence. It was France t=
hat first brought an orderly nationalism out of feudal chaos; it was her ro=
yal house of Capet that rallied Europe to the rescue of the Holy Sepulchre =
and led the greatest of the crusades to Palestine. Yet the France of the la=
st crusades was within a century the France of Crecy, just as the France of=
Austerlitz was more speedily the France of Waterloo; and men who followed =
the tricolour at Solferino lived to see it furled in humiliation at Sedan. =
No other country has had a history as prolific in triumph and reverse, in e=
pochs of peaceful progress and periods of civil commotion, in pageant and t=
ragedy, in all that gives fascination to historical narrative. Happy the la=
nd whose annals are tiresome! Not such has been the fortune of poor old Fra=
nce. The sage Tocqueville has somewhere remarked that whether France was lo=
ved or hated by the outside world she could not be ignored. That is very tr=
ue. The Gaul has at all stages of his national history defied an attitude o=
f indifference in others. His country has been at many times the head and a=
t all times the heart of Europe. His hysteria has made Europe hysterical, w=
hile his sober national sense at critical moments has held the whole contin=
ent to good behaviour. For a half-dozen centuries there was never a squabbl=
e at any remote part of Europe in which France did not stand ready and will=
ing to take a hand on the slightest opportunity. That policy, as pursued pa=
rticularly by Louis XIV and the Bonapartes, made a heavy drain in brawn and=
brain on the vitality of the race; but despite it all, the peaceful achiev=
ements of France within her own borders continued to astonish mankind. It i=
s this astounding vigour, this inexhaustible stamina, this unexampled recup=
erative power that has at all times made France a nation which, whether men=
admire or condemn her policy, can never be treated with indifference. It w=
as these qualities which enabled her, throughout exhausting foreign trouble=
s, to retain her leadership in European scholarship, in philosophy, art, an=
d architecture; this is what has enabled France to be the grim warrior of E=
urope without ceasing ever to be the idealist of the nations. It was during=
one of her proud and prosperous eras that France began her task of creatin=
g an empire beyond the Atlantic. At no time, indeed, was she better equippe=
d for the work. No power of Western Europe since the days of Roman glory ha=
d possessed such facilities for conquering and governing new lands. If ever=
there was a land able and ready to take up the white man' s burden it was =
the France of the seventeenth century. The nation had become the first mili=
tary power of Europe. Spain and Italy had ceased to be serious rivals. Even=
England, under the Stuart dynasty, tacitly admitted the military primacy o=
f France. Nor was this superiority of the French confined to the science of=
war. It passed unquestioned in the arts of peace. Even Rome at the height =
of her power could not dominate every field of human activity. She could ru=
le the people with authority and overcome the proud; but even her own poets=
rendered homage to Greece in the realms of art, sculpture, and eloquence. =
But France was the aesthetic as well as the military dictator of seventeent=
h- century Europe. Her authority was supreme, as Macaulay says, on all matt=
ers from orthodoxy in architecture to the proper cut of a courtier' s cloth=
es. Her monarchs were the first gentlemen of Europe. Her nobility set the s=
ocial standards of the day. The rank and file of her people--and there were=
at least twenty million of them in the days of Louis Quatorze--were making=
a fertile land yield its full increase. The country was powerful, rich, pr=
osperous, and, for the time being, outwardly contented. So far as her form =
and spirit of government went, France by the middle of the seventeenth cent=
ury was a despotism both in theory and in fact. Men were still living who c=
ould recall the day when France had a real parliament, the Estates-General =
as it was called. This body had at one time all the essentials of a represe=
ntative assembly. It might have become, as the English House of Commons bec=
ame, the grand inquest of the nation. But it did not do so. The waxing pers=
onal strength of the monarchy curbed its influence, its authority weakened,=
and throughout the great century of French colonial expansion from 1650 to=
1750 the Estates-General was never convoked. The centralization of politic=
al power was complete. ' The State! I am the State.' These famous words imp=
uted to Louis XIV expressed no vain boast of royal power. Speaking politica=
lly, France was a pyramid. At the apex was the Bourbon sovereign. In him al=
l lines of authority converged. Subordinate to him in authority, and domina=
ted by him when he willed it, were various appointive councils, among them =
the Council of State and the so-called Parliament of Paris, which was not a=
parliament at all, but a semi- judicial body entrusted with the function o=
f registering the royal decrees. Below these in the hierarchy of officialdo=
m came the intendants of the various provinces --forty or more of them. Loy=
al agents of the crown were these intendants. They saw to it that no royal =
mandate ever went unheeded in any part of the king' s domain. These forty i=
ntendants were the men who really bridged the great administrative gulf whi=
ch lay between the royal court and the people. They were the most conspicuo=
us, the most important, and the most characteristic officials of the old re=
gime. Without them the royal authority would have tumbled over by its own s=
heer top-heaviness. They were the eyes and ears of the monarchy; they provi=
ded the monarch with fourscore eager hands to work his sovereign will. The =
intendants, in turn, had their underlings, known as the sub-delegates, who =
held the peasantry in leash. Thus it was that the administration, like a py=
ramid, broadened towards its base, and the whole structure rested upon the =
third estate, or rank and file of the people. Such was the position, the po=
wer, and administrative framework of France when her kings and people turne=
d their eyes westward across the seas. From the rugged old Norman and Breto=
n seaports courageous mariners had been for a long time lengthening their v=
oyages to new coasts. As early as 1534 Jacques Cartier of St Malo had made =
the first of his pilgrimages to the St Lawrence, and in 1542 his associate =
Roberval had attempted to plant a colony there. They had found the shores o=
f the great river to be inhospitable; the winters were rigorous; no stores =
of mineral wealth had appeared; nor did the land seem to possess great agri=
cultural possibilities. From Mexico the Spanish galleons were bearing home =
their rich cargoes of silver bullion. In Virginia the English navigators ha=
d found a land of fair skies and fertile soil. But the hills and valleys of=
the northland had shouted no such greeting to the voyageurs of Brittany. C=
artier had failed to make his landfall at Utopia, and the balance-sheet of =
his achievements, when cast up in 1544, had offered a princely dividend of =
disappointment. For a half-century following the abortive efforts of Cartie=
r and Roberval, the French authorities had made no serious or successful at=
tempt to plant a colony in the New World. That is not surprising, for there=
were troubles in plenty at home. Huguenots and Catholics were at each othe=
r' s throats; the wars of the Fronde convulsed the land; and it was not til=
l the very end of the sixteenth century that the country settled down to pe=
ace within its own borders. Some facetious chronicler has remarked that the=
three chief causes of early warfare were Christianity, herrings, and clove=
s. There is much golden truth in that nugget. For if one could take from hu=
man history all the strife that has been due either to bigotry or to commer=
cial avarice, a fair portion of the bloodstreaks would be washed from its p=
ages. For the time being, at any rate, France had so much fighting at home =
that she was unable, like her Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and English neigh=
bours, to gain strategic points for future fighting abroad. Those were days=
when, if a people would possess the gates of their enemies, it behoved the=
m to begin early. France made a late start, and she was forced to take, in =
consequence, what other nations had shown no eagerness to seize. It was Sam=
uel Champlain, a seaman of Brouage, who first secured for France and for Fr=
enchmen a sure foothold in North America, and thus became the herald of Bou=
rbon imperialism. After a youth spent at sea, Champlain engaged for some ye=
ars in the armed conflicts with the Huguenots; then he returned to his old =
marine life once more. He sailed to the Spanish main and elsewhere, thereby=
gaining skill as a navigator and ambition to be an explorer of new coasts.=
In 1603 came an opportunity to join an expedition to the St Lawrence, and =
from this time to the end of his days the Brouage mariner gave his whole in=
terest and energies to the work of planting an outpost of empire in the New=
World. Champlain was scarcely thirty-six when he made his first voyage to =
Canada; he died at Quebec on Christmas Day, 1635. His service to the king a=
nd nation extended over three decades. With the crew of his little vessel, =
the Don de Dieu, Champlain cast anchor on July 9, 1608, beneath the frownin=
g natural ramparts of Cape Diamond, and became the founder of a city built =
upon a rock. The felling of trees and the hewing of wood began. Within a fe=
w weeks Champlain raised his rude fort, brought his provisions ashore, esta=
blished relations with the Indians, and made ready with his twenty-eight fo=
llowers to spend the winter in the new settlement. It was a painful experie=
nce. The winter was long and bitter; scurvy raided the Frenchmen' s cramped=
quarters, and in the spring only eight followers were alive to greet the s=
hip which came with new colonists and supplies. It took a soul of iron to c=
ontinue the project of nation-planting after such a tragic beginning; but C=
hamplain was not the man to recoil from the task. More settlers were landed=
; women and children were brought along; land was broken for cultivation; a=
nd in due course a little village grew up about the fort. This was Quebec, =
the centre and soul of French hopes beyond the Atlantic. For the first twen=
ty years of its existence the little colony had a stormy time. Some of the =
settlers were unruly, and gave Champlain, who was both maker and enforcer o=
f the laws, a hard task to hold them in control. During these years the kin=
g took little interest in his new domains; settlers came slowly, and those =
who came seemed to be far more interested in trading with the Indians than =
in carving out permanent homes for themselves. Few there were among them wh=
o thought of anything but a quick competence from the profits of the fur tr=
ade, and a return to France at the earliest opportunity thereafter. Now it =
was the royal idea, in so far as the busy monarch of France had any fixed p=
urpose in the matter, that the colony should be placed upon a feudal basis-=
-that lands should be granted and sub-granted on feudal terms. In other wor=
ds, the king or his representative stood ready to give large tracts or fief=
s in New France to all immigrants whose station in life warranted the belie=
f that they would maintain the dignity of seigneurs. These, in turn, were t=
o sub-grant the land to ordinary settlers, who came without financial resou=
rces, sent across usually at the expense of His Majesty. In this way the Fr=
ench authorities hoped to create a powerful military colony with a feudal h=
ierarchy as its outstanding feature. Feudalism is a much-abused term. To th=
e minds of most laymen it has a rather hazy association with things despoti=
c, oppressive, and mediaeval. The mere mention of the term conjures up thos=
e days of the Dark Ages when armour-clad knights found their chief recreati=
on in running lances through one another; when the overworked, underfed lab=
ourers of the field cringed and cowered before every lordly whim. Most read=
ers seem to get their notions of chivalry from Scott' s Talisman, and their=
ideas on feudalism from the same author' s immortal Ivanhoe. While scholar=
s keep up a merry disputation as to the historical origin of the feudal sys=
tem, the public imagination goes steadily on with its own curious picture o=
f how that system lived and moved and had its being. A prolix tale of origi=
ns would be out of place in this chronicle; but even the mind of the man in=
the street ought to be set right as regards what feudalism was designed to=
do, and what in fact it did, for mankind, while civilization battled its w=
ay down the ages. Feudalism was a system of social relations based upon lan=
d. It grew out of the chaos which came upon Europe in the centuries followi=
ng the collapse of the Roman Empire. The fall of Roman power flattened the =
whole political structure of Western Europe, and nothing arose to take its =
place. Every lord or princeling was left to depend for defence upon the str=
ength of his own arm; so he gathered around him as many vassals as he could=
He gave them land; they gave him what he most wanted,--a promise to serve=
and aid in time of war. The lord gave and promised to guard; the vassal to=
ok and promised to serve. Thus there was created a personal relation, a bon=
d of mutual loyalty, wardship, and service, which bound liegeman to lord wi=
th hoops of steel. No one can read Carlyle' s trenchant Past and Present wi=
thout bearing away some vivid and altogether wholesome impressions concerni=
ng the essential humanity of this great mediaeval institution. It shares wi=
th the Christian Church the honour of having made life worth living in days=
when all else combined to make it intolerable. It brought at least a sembl=
ance of social, economic, and political order out of helpless and hopeless =
disorganization. It helped Europe slowly to recover from the greatest catas=
trophe in all her history. But our little systems have their day, as the po=
et assures us. They have their day and cease to be. Feudalism had its day, =
from dawn to twilight a day of picturesque memory. But it did not cease to =
exist when its day of service was done. Long after the necessity for mutual=
service and protection had passed away; long after the growth of firm mona=
rchies with powerful standing armies had established the reign of law, the =
feudal system kept its hold upon the social order in France and elsewhere. =
The obligation of military service, when no longer needed, was replaced by =
dues and payments. The modern cash nexus replaced the old personal bond bet=
ween vassal and lord. The feudal system became the seigneurial system. The =
lord became the seigneur; the vassal became the censitaire or peasant culti=
vator whose chief function was to yield revenue for his seigneur' s purse. =
These were great changes which sapped the spirit of the ancient institution=
No longer bound to their dependants by any personal tie, the seigneurs us=
ually turned affairs over to their bailiffs, men with hearts of adamant, wh=
o squeezed from the seigneuries every sou the hapless peasantry could yield=
These publicans of the old regime have much to answer for. They and their=
work were not least among the causes which brought upon the crown and upon=
the privileged orders that terrible retribution of the Red Terror. Not wit=
h the mediaeval institution of feudalism, but with its emaciated descendant=
, the seigneurial system of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ought=
men to associate, if they must, their notions of grinding oppression and c=
lass hatred. Out to his new colony on the St Lawrence the king sent this se=
igneurial system. A gross and gratuitous outrage, a characteristic manifest=
ation of Bourbon stupidity--that is a common verdict upon the royal action.=
But it may well be asked: What else was there to do? The seigneurial syste=
m was still the basis of land tenure in France. The nobility and even the t=
hrone rested upon it. The Church sanctioned and supported it. The people in=
general, whatever their attitude towards seigneurialism, were familiar wit=
h no other system of landholding. It was not, like the encomienda system wh=
ich Spain planted in Mexico, an arrangement cut out of new cloth for the mo=
re ruthless exploitation of a fruitful domain. The Puritan who went to Mass=
achusetts Bay took his system of socage tenure along with him. The common l=
aw went with the flag of England. It was quite as natural that the Custom o=
f Paris should follow the fleurs-de-lis. There was every reason to expect, =
moreover, that in the New World the seigneurial system would soon free itse=
lf from those barnacles of privilege and oppression which were encrusted on=
its sides at home. Here was a small settlement of pioneers surrounded by h=
ostile aborigines. The royal arm, strong as it was at home, could not well =
afford protection a thousand leagues away. The colony must organize and lea=
rn to protect itself. In other words, the colonial environment was very muc=
h like that in which the yeomen of the Dark Ages had found themselves. And =
might not its dangers be faced in the old feudal way? They were faced in th=
is way. In the history of French Canada we find the seigneurial system forc=
ed back towards its old feudal plane. We see it gain in vitality; we see th=
e old personal bond between lord and vassal restored to some of its pristin=
e strength; we see the military aspects of the system revived, and its more=
sordid phases thrust aside. It turned New France into a huge armed camp; i=
t gave the colony a closely knit military organization; and, in a day when =
Canada needed every ounce of her strength to ward off encircling enemies bo=
th white and red, it did for her what no other system could be expected to =
do. But to return to the little cradle of empire at the foot of Cape Diamon=
d. Champlain for a score of years worked himself to premature old age in ov=
ercoming those many obstacles which always meet the pioneer. More settlers =
were brought; a few seigneuries were granted; priests were summoned from Fr=
ance; a new fort was built; and by sheer perseverance a settlement of about=
three hundred souls had been established by 1627. But no single individual=
, however untiring in his efforts, could do all that needed to be done. It =
was consequently arranged, with the entire approval of Champlain, that the =
task of building up the colony should be entrusted to a great colonizing co=
mpany formed for the purpose under royal auspices. In this project the movi=
ng spirit was no less a personage than Cardinal Richelieu, the great minist=
er of Louis XIII. Official France was now really interested. Hitherto its i=
nterest, while profusely enough expressed, had been little more than perfun=
ctory. With Richelieu as its sponsor a company was easily organized. Though=
by royal decree it was chartered as the Company of New France, it became m=
ore commonly known as the Company of One Hundred Associates; for it was a c=
o-operative organization with one hundred members, some of them traders and=
merchants, but more of them courtiers. Colonizing companies were the fashi=
on of Richelieu' s day. Holland and England were exploiting new lands by th=
e use of companies; there was no good reason why France should not do likew=
ise. This system of company exploitation was particularly popular with the =
monarchs of all these European countries. It made no demands on the royal p=
urse. If failure attended the company' s ventures the king bore no financia=
l loss. But if the company succeeded, if its profits were large and its ach=
ievements great, the king might easily step in and claim his share of it al=
l as the price of royal protection and patronage. In both England and Holla=
nd the scheme worked out in that way. An English stock company began and de=
veloped the work which finally placed India in the possession of the Britis=
h crown; a similar Dutch organization in due course handed over Java as a r=
ich patrimony to the king of the Netherlands. France, however, was not so f=
ortunate. True enough, the Company of One Hundred Associates made a brave s=
tart; its charter gave great privileges, and placed on the company large ob=
ligations; it seemed as though a new era in French colonization had begun. =
' Having in view the establishment of a powerful military colony,' as this =
charter recites, the king gave to the associates the entire territory claim=
ed by France in the western hemisphere, with power to govern, create trade,=
grant lands, and bestow titles of nobility. For its part the company was t=
o send out settlers, at least two hundred of them a year; it was to provide=
them with free transportation, give them free lands and initial subsistenc=
e; it was to support priests and teachers--in fact, to do all things necess=
ary for the creation of that ' powerful military colony' which His Majesty =
had in expectation.</span></p>=20
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