[624] in WWW Security List Archive

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Re: HTTP "Referer" field considered harmful

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Goran Oberg)
Tue Apr 25 07:22:09 1995

To: wmperry@spry.com
Cc: Paul Phillips <psphilli@sdcc8.UCSD.EDU>, www-security@ns2.rutgers.edu,
        Goran.Oberg@dc.luth.se
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 24 Apr 1995 18:42:00 PDT."
             <m0s3ZeL-00000EC@monolith> 
Date: Tue, 25 Apr 1995 10:08:24 +0200
From: Goran Oberg <Goran.Oberg@dc.luth.se>
Errors-To: owner-www-security@ns2.rutgers.edu


To omit everything after a question mark would not solve the problem. It
could give a false sense of security and that's something I think we should
try to stay clear of.

In the case of SATAN it wouldn't do any good as SATAN URLs are in the form
http://<localhost>:<unknown_high_port_number>/<unknown_magic_cookie>/<path>
and would be revealed all the same. So anyone running SATAN using the WWW-
interface shouldn't connect to other servers in the midst of a SATAN-session.


Wkr

/G


PS.  s/SATAN/SANTA/g if ( $OFFENDED );    (-:


> > The http spec has (and has had) this to say about it:
> > 
> >        Note: Because the source of a link may be considered private
> >        information or may reveal an otherwise secure information
> >        source, it is strongly recommended that the user be able to
> >        select whether or not the Referer field is sent. For
> >        example, a browser client could have a toggle switch for
> >        browsing openly/anonymously, which would respectively
> >        enable/disable the sending of Referer and From information.
> > 
> > I am unaware of any browsers that implement this option (not to say that 
> > none do, but if it exists on any that I use, it's well hidden.) This is 
> > far from a complete solution, because it relies on the user not to 
> > redistribute the URL rather than keeping it under the control of the 
> > server.  It is part and parcel in the protocol that the user must know the 
> > URL, though, because the browser had to open to it in the first place.  
> > Thus you are correct that assuming a URL will remain secret is inherently 
> > insecure.
> 
>   One way to get around this would be to say that browsers should never
> send the 'query' part of a URL in a Referer: field.
> 
> -Bill P.


--
 Gvran Vberg       University of Lulee, SWEDEN          Student MSc CS
 Kerhusvdgen 5:414 <URL:http://www.luth.se/~goggi/>     Adm./CoAdm. of
 S-977 54 Lulee    Goran.Oberg@dc.luth.se       {www,wais,ftp,gopher}.luth.se
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