[48275] in linux-announce channel archive
Lucky chance to receive a FREE Kobalt Tool Set
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Congratulations)
Wed Apr 16 08:51:31 2025
Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 07:51:29 -0500
From: "Congratulations" <KobaltToolSetunlocked@mastercard.za.com>
Reply-To: "Congratulations" <KobaltToolSetunlocked@mastercard.za.com>
To: <linuxch-announce.discuss@charon.mit.edu>
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Lucky chance to receive a FREE Kobalt Tool Set
http://mastercard.za.com/XHf4QkoekBIbultomV9y4IV6auO2_Bbw2S1cto0QQhKY0hb-
http://mastercard.za.com/WNKH_gNzu5DAfk5D_NU3p-se9ManfeNSitvOx1MiFLYBMR4
ossible to establish the conceivability of zombies, so the argument, lacking its first premise, fails.
Daniel Dennett argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition". He coined the term "zimboes"—p-zombies that have second-order beliefs—in arguing that p-zombies are incoherent: "Zimboes thinkZ they are conscious, thinkZ they have qualia, thinkZ they suffer pains—they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!" In The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies (1995), Dennett compares consciousness to health.
Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination you can remove consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems intact—a quite standard but entirely bogus feat of imagination—is like supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove health while leaving all bodily functions and powers intact. … Health isn't that sort of thing, and neither is consciousness.
Michael Lynch argues that the zombie conceivability argument forces us to either question whether we actually have consciousness or accept that zombies are impossible. If zombies falsely believe they are conscious, how can we be sure we are not zombies? We may believe we have conscious mental states when in fact we merely hold a false belief. Lynch thinks denying the possibility of zombies is more reasonable than questioning our own consciousness.
Daniel Stoljar has proposed what he calls "the phenome
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<div style="color:#FFFFFF;font-size:8px;">ossible to establish the conceivability of zombies, so the argument, lacking its first premise, fails. Daniel Dennett argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition". He coined the term "zimboes"—p-zombies that have second-order beliefs—in arguing that p-zombies are incoherent: "Zimboes thinkZ they are conscious, thinkZ they have qualia, thinkZ they suffer pains—they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!" In The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies (1995), Dennett compares consciousness to health. Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination you can remove consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems intact—a quite standard but entirely bogus feat of imagination—is like supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove health while leaving all bodily functions and powers intact. … Health isn't that sort of thing, and neither is consciousness. Michael Lynch argues that the zombie conceivability argument forces us to either question whether we actually have consciousness or accept that zombies are impossible. If zombies falsely believe they are conscious, how can we be sure we are not zombies? We may believe we have conscious mental states when in fact we merely hold a false belief. Lynch thinks denying the possibility of zombies is more reasonable than questioning our own consciousness. Daniel Stoljar has proposed what he calls "the phenome</div>
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