[993] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Access to Storage and Communication Keys
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Michael C Taylor)
Tue Jun 10 15:30:59 1997
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 1997 15:20:50 -0300 (ADT)
From: Michael C Taylor <mctaylor@mta.ca>
To: Kent Crispin <kent@songbird.com>
cc: cryptography@c2.net
In-Reply-To: <19970610112926.04400@bywater.songbird.com>
On Tue, 10 Jun 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 10, 1997 at 12:12:36PM -0700, Phil Helms wrote:
> >
> > I could envision situations where you wouldn't want to backup plaintext,
> > but only ciphertext. In those situations, key backup would also be
>
> If you have data you wish to guard from disclosure I think that in
> most circumstances you want to back up ciphertext. It is a *lot*
> cheaper to secure a piece of paper with a passphrase on it (in a safe
> deposit box, for example) than it is guard a gigabyte of backup tapes.
Why is a safe deposit box more expensive when you put a single DLT in it
verus a single sheet of paper? With a single DLT cartridge you can store
up to 20-40GB of data. Terrabytes of data, maybe?
I agree with the idea that safe 'secure' storage of small number
of keys (<1MB) combined with safe (read: archivial) storage of a
large volume of encrypted data is cheaper than safe 'secure'
storage a large volume of unencrypted data (>50GB).
An poor example is, a tape of encrypted data can be left in a
shared tape unit as compared to a tape of unencrypted data, which you
wouldn't want to leave in the unit once the backup is finished.
This example is concerned with prevention of unauthorized access, but does
not prevent unauthorized deletation or overwriting of data.
--
Michael C. Taylor <mctaylor@mta.ca> <http://www.mta.ca/~mctaylor/>
Nonlinear Code Generator, Mount Allison University, Canada
"Real programmers don't write in BASIC. Actually, no
programmers write in BASIC after reaching puberty."
