[9832] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (pasward@big.uwaterloo.ca)
Wed Nov 21 17:30:00 2001
From: <pasward@big.uwaterloo.ca>
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Message-ID: <15356.9762.565006.94568@tolstoy.uwaterloo.ca>
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 17:09:38 -0500
To: "Jay D. Dyson" <jdyson@treachery.net>
Cc: Cryptography List <cryptography@wasabisystems.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.3.96.1011121135054.10532G-100000@crypto>
Jay D. Dyson writes:
> On Wed, 21 Nov 2001 pasward@big.uwaterloo.ca wrote:
>
> > > Everyone remember First Virtual's Nat Borenstein's "major discovery"
> > > of the keyboard logger?
> > >
> > > 'Magic Lantern' part of new 'Enhanced Carnivore Project'
> >
> > In the same vein, but a different application, does anyone know what the
> > state of the art is for detecting such tampering? In particular, when
> > sitting at a PC doing banking, is there any mechanism by which a user
> > can know that the PC is not corrupted with such a key logger? The last
> > time I checked, there was nothing other than the various anti-virus
> > software.
>
> As much as this will sound like a panacean suggestion, I'd say the
> best way to avoid being a victim of this sort of attack is to dump Windows
> and utilize Linux (or Solaris x86) with a GUI front end. With the advance
> of *nix GUIs and the advent of utility suites such as Sun Microsystems'
> Star Office, I've long since abandoned any justification to continue using
> the Microsoft Windows operating system and office-oriented applications.
>
> Yet another reason why Open Source is your friend.
I did not mean to imply that I am running some variety of windows. I
am interested in the technical problem of what is the state of the art
for detecting whether or not a computer has been tampered with. The
use of some version of un*x does not per se solve this.
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