[9528] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [FYI] Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists? (addenda to chargebacks)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (lynn.wheeler@firstdata.com)
Thu Sep 27 15:21:07 2001
To: "Enzo Michelangeli" <em@em.no-ip.com>
Cc: "Ray Dillinger" <bear@sonic.net>,
"Ben Laurie" <ben@algroup.co.uk>, cryptography@wasabisystems.com,
"Hadmut Danisch" <hadmut@danisch.de>, jim_windle@eudoramail.com
Message-ID: <OF6E0CCDFB.DFA5A658-ON87256AD4.0067E83D@LocalDomain>
From: lynn.wheeler@firstdata.com
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2001 13:04:18 -0600
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Basically there are chargeback rules for card holder present, card present,
as well as ability to read track 1&2 (on mag. stripe). One of the issues is
that even in card present scenerios with indication that trace 1&2 could be
read, there are starting to be counterfeits and fraudulent transactions:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm "out of control credit card fraud"
In the X9.59 scenerio using something along the lines of an AADS card:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#straw
there is plauseability that it could represent "stronger" authentication
than current card present (i.e. much harder to counterfeit) even when
non-face-to-face, MOTO, &/or internet transactions are involved.
However, fraudulent transactions (either in MOTO/internet scenerio or card
present ... because of short-comings in strength of authentication) still
doesn't account for all the reasons for charge-backs &/or disputes ... aka
even given absolute perfect authentication and no (consumer) fraudulent
transactions ... there are still reasons for charge-backs and/or disputes.
ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#publickey
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