[9399] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

home help back first fref pref prev next nref lref last post

Re: chip-level randomness?

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bill Frantz)
Wed Sep 19 15:06:57 2001

Message-Id: <v03110702b7ce96b6aa32@[165.247.200.56]>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.21.0109190107330.19149-100000@ultra.gawth.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 11:42:28 -0700
To: Bram Cohen <bram@gawth.com>,
	Pawel Krawczyk <kravietz@aba.krakow.pl>
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
Cc: cryptography@wasabisystems.com

At 1:12 AM -0700 9/19/01, Bram Cohen wrote:
>Of course, there's the religion of people who say that /dev/random output
>'needs' to contain 'all real' entropy, despite the absolute zero increase
>in security this results in and the disastrous effect it can have on
>performance.

If I am generating one time pads, I would certainly prefer /dev/random
output to /dev/urandom output.  There is much less algorithm exposure.
(Although I do still have to worry about the whitening and combining
algorithms.)

Cheers - Bill


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz           | The principal effect of| Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506         | DMCA/SDMI is to prevent| 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz@pwpconsult.com | fair use.              | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA





---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com

home help back first fref pref prev next nref lref last post