[9143] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: If we had key escrow, Scarfo wouldn't be a problem
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Arnold G. Reinhold)
Thu Aug 16 11:49:52 2001
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Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2001 10:45:00 -0400
To: Jim Choate <ravage@ssz.com>,
"Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin@law.miami.edu>
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
Cc: Dennis Glatting <dennis.glatting@software-munitions.com>,
Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>, cryptography@wasabisystems.com
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At 5:33 PM -0500 8/15/2001, Jim Choate wrote:
>On Wed, 15 Aug 2001, Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law wrote:
>
>> To be clear, I am *NOT* arguing for key escrow. Just saying that since
>> I'm against it, I accept that there may be scope for judicious,
>> paper-trail oriented, key logging.=A0
>
>Of course there is, the question is does one use the key logging to get
>probable cause; or as the 4th requires probable cause to do the key
>logging.
>
>The current trend is to use surveillance technology to obtain 'probable
>cause', this is in direct opposition to the letter and intent of the 4th.
>
>Got a warrant, scan, search, collect all you want. Don't have a warrant
>then leave people the hell alone.
>
I don't think anyone in the Scarfo case is denying the need for=20
probable cause. The issue, as I understand it, is whether an ordinary=20
search warrant, which the FBI got, is enough or whether a=20
more-difficult-to-obtain electronic surveillance order was required.
Arnold Reinhold
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