[8963] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Sender and receiver non-repudiation
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (David Honig)
Tue Jul 3 15:51:35 2001
Message-Id: <3.0.6.32.20010703110055.008d3c90@pop.sprynet.com>
Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2001 11:00:55 -0700
To: Lynn.Wheeler@firstdata.com,
Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou <pkotzani@unipi.gr>
From: David Honig <honig@sprynet.com>
Cc: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
In-Reply-To: <OFAF552EDA.B0A5E066-ON88256A7E.00564897@fdcsg.1dc.com>
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At 08:55 AM 7/3/01 -0700, Lynn.Wheeler@firstdata.com wrote:
>signing. With digital signatures it becomes murkier ... how does somebody
>know that what they are looking at is the same thing that the computer is
>calculating a digital signature for.
Good point. There's no way without a trusted host somewhere.
Imagine that you scanned the paper doc, inspected it visually,
and digitally signed the image file. Even this is succeptible to
a trojan that alters the display, alters what's printed, etc.
If you do have a little trusted island, e.g., a java button
on a ring you wear in the shower, or a PDA display you trust,
you can often leverage this to make a trusted system.
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