[8738] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Hadmut Danisch)
Fri May 25 17:45:09 2001
From: Hadmut Danisch <hadmut@danisch.de>
Date: Fri, 25 May 2001 23:10:23 +0200
To: Enzo Michelangeli <em@em.no-ip.com>
Cc: cryptography@wasabisystems.com, coderpunks@toad.com
Message-ID: <20010525231023.A7576@danisch.de>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <002d01c0e4ba$eb3fa280$011010ac@ima.com>; from em@who.net on Fri, May 25, 2001 at 09:34:20AM +0800
On Fri, May 25, 2001 at 09:34:20AM +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
> On another mailing list, someone posted an interesting question: how to
> ascertain that a tamperproof device (e.g., a smartcard) contains no hidden
> backdoors?
What about this:
Don't use a tamperproof _device_.
Use a device consisting of n tamperproof modules instead.
Have the device built in a way such that someone needs
to tamper with at least m, 1 < m <=n, modules to be successful.
(Simple example: Use a chain of encryption modules from
distinct manufacturers...)
Hadmut
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com
