[8381] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metrics
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Arnold G. Reinhold)
Wed Jan 3 22:47:47 2001
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In-Reply-To: <B6795A48.48E5%peter.fairbrother@ntlworld.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2001 22:38:43 -0500
To: Peter Fairbrother <peter.fairbrother@ntlworld.com>,
Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>, John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
Cc: <cryptography@c2.net>
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At 10:38 PM +0000 1/3/2001, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>on 3/1/01 9:25 pm, Greg Rose at ggr@qualcomm.com wrote:
>
> > At Crypto a
>> couple of years ago the invited lecture gave some very general results
>> about unconditionally secure ciphers... unfortunately I can't remember
>> exactly who gave the lecture, but I think it might have been Oded
>> Goldreich... forgive me if I'm wrong. The important result, though, was
>> that you need truly random input to the algorithm in an amount equal to the
>> stuff being protected, or you cannot have unconditional security.
>
>Not so. Perfect compression with encryption works too.
>
How does perfect compression prevent a known plaintext attack?
Arnold Reinhold
PS I am also curious why Mr. Smith considers 1024-bit RSA to be
"Conditionally Computationally Secure."
