[8109] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (R. A. Hettinga)
Mon Nov 20 13:54:04 2000
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Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000 13:25:19 -0500
To: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>,
Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>, Lynn.Wheeler@firstdata.com
From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah@shipwright.com>
Cc: Bram Cohen <bram@gawth.com>, obfuscation@beta.freedom.net,
cryptography@c2.net, cypherpunks@cyberpass.net, dbs@philodox.com,
dcsb@ai.mit.edu
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At 12:10 PM -0500 on 11/20/00, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
> If CAs
> included a financial guarantee of whatever it is they are asserting
> when they issue a certificate, then all these problems would go away.
Right.
Like Ellison (and Metzger :-)) have said for years now, the only
"assertions" worth making are financial ones. "Identity", biometric/meat,
or otherwise, is only a proxy for asset protection anyway.
I claim you can do this on the net without the current mystification of
identity that exists in the financial system, using bearer asset
cryptography, among other things, but that's another discussion altogether.
Cheers,
RAH
--
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
