[78167] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Thor Lancelot Simon)
Tue Jan 30 11:33:30 2007
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 12:47:18 -0500
From: Thor Lancelot Simon <tls@rek.tjls.com>
To: Victor Duchovni <Victor.Duchovni@MorganStanley.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Reply-To: tls@rek.tjls.com
In-Reply-To: <20070126164258.GG11368@piias899.ms.com>
On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 11:42:58AM -0500, Victor Duchovni wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 07:06:00PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>
> > In some cases it may be useful to send the entire chain, one such being when a
> > CA re-issues its root with a new expiry date, as Verisign did when its roots
> > expired in December 1999. The old root can be used to verify the new root.
>
> Wouldn't the old root also (until it actually expires) verify any
> certificates signed by the new root? If so, why does a server need to
> send the new root? So long as the recipient has either the new or the
> old root, the chain will be valid.
That doesn't make sense to me -- the end-of-chain (server or client)
certificate won't be signed by _both_ the old and new root, I wouldn't
think (does x.509 even make this possible)?
That means that for a party trying to validate a certificate signed by
the new root, but who has only the old root, the new root's certificate
will be a necessary intermediate step in the chain to the old root, which
that party trusts (assuming the new root is signed by the old root, that
is).
Or do I misunderstand?
Thor
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