[7345] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: KeyGhost
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (David Honig)
Mon Jun 19 13:41:49 2000
Message-Id: <3.0.6.32.20000619074840.00814210@pop.sprynet.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2000 07:48:40 -0700
To: die@die.com, Steve Reid <sreid@sea-to-sky.net>
From: David Honig <honig@sprynet.com>
Cc: cryptography@c2.net
In-Reply-To: <20000618215706.B26170@die.com>
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At 09:57 PM 6/18/00 -0400, Dave Emery wrote:
> One hopes that the US Customs Service and the other federal
>agencies involved in enforcing Title III of the Omnibus Safe Streets and
>Crime Control Act of 1968 (18 USC 2518) covering devices "primarily
>useful for the serreptitious interception of wire, oral or electronic
>communications" (which was originally aimed at bugs and similar
>listening devices) learns of these things and bans them from sale to the
>public
But they're useful for writers whose machines crash, according
to a non-covert app they write up. Uh huh.
>and also to make versions that contain burst radio transmitters
>that dump the keystroke memory
I'm looking forward to video cluster bombs: disperse tennis ball
sized devices with: imagers, GPS, burst radio, and (authenticated,
to prevent spoofing for detection) burst-radio-relay. They know where
they are, and what they see, and forward it to the generals via that relay
function.
>Such infrequent transmissions would
>be much harder for a TSCM electronic countermeasures sweep to find than
>something that radiated continuously.
As the State Dept's interior decorators now know...
