[7208] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: NSA back doors in encryption products
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jim Choate)
Sat May 27 16:07:36 2000
Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 14:39:47 -0500 (CDT)
From: Jim Choate <ravage@ssz.com>
To: David Honig <honig@sprynet.com>
Cc: Eugene Leitl <eugene.leitl@lrz.uni-muenchen.de>,
Rick Smith <rick_smith@securecomputing.com>,
"Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>,
John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>, cryptography@c2.net, gnu@cygnus.com
In-Reply-To: <3.0.6.32.20000526073052.0080be50@pop.sprynet.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1000526143838.2690B-100000@einstein.ssz.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
On Fri, 26 May 2000, David Honig wrote:
> At 09:54 PM 5/24/00 -0500, Jim Choate wrote:
> >As to inserting a trapdoor in an FPGA, I don't see any reason at all that
> >a trapdoor can't be inserted with the appropriate understanding of the
> >state space and chosing a rare state to trigger your bypass.
>
> Yes but *once* you've verified the RTL (and from them the masks)
> you don't have to worry about some stray applet hosing your security.
> You do with software.
No, you don't. Sign the source and binaries.
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