[7175] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: NSA back doors in encryption products
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Eugene Leitl)
Wed May 24 21:36:28 2000
From: Eugene Leitl <eugene.leitl@lrz.uni-muenchen.de>
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Message-ID: <14636.30379.44116.968436@lrz.uni-muenchen.de>
Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 17:41:15 -0700 (PDT)
To: Jim Choate <ravage@einstein.ssz.com>
Cc: Eugene Leitl <Eugene.Leitl@lrz.uni-muenchen.de>,
Rick Smith <rick_smith@securecomputing.com>,
"Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>,
John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>, cryptography@c2.net, gnu@cygnus.com
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1000524184144.30672K-100000@einstein.ssz.com>
Jim Choate writes:
> Bull, the hardware companies aren't any more trustworthy.
True. You can always validate a few from a batch by plasma etching the
device, and trace the structures on an electromicrograph (some EMs
allow you to observe the device in operation).
Also, it is hard to insert a trapdoor into an FPGA. OpenSource hardware.
