[7172] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: NSA back doors in encryption products
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Rick Smith)
Wed May 24 18:59:21 2000
Message-Id: <3.0.3.32.20000524163704.00949c10@mailhost.sctc.com>
Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 16:37:04 -0500
To: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
From: Rick Smith <rick_smith@securecomputing.com>
Cc: Enzo Michelangeli <enzom@bigfoot.com>, John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>,
cryptography@c2.net, gnu@cygnus.com
In-Reply-To: <392C4340.D7ECF806@algroup.co.uk>
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At 10:01 PM 05/24/2000 +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
>Amusing though the MS/NSA speculations are, I'm more interested in the
>general point: i.e. proving that primes are prime. Having a black box
>that claims to do that doesn't really light my fire.
The most interesting thing I find about the discussion is to identify
specific weak links within a system that provide the most benefit to an
attacker. At the same time, we identify the parts of the system that most
need review, analysis, and testing, when we identify the weak links.
Rick.
smith@securecomputing.com
