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Re: Perfect Forward Security def wanted

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jerome Etienne)
Thu May 4 11:31:36 2000

Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 10:00:59 -0400
From: Jerome Etienne <jetienne@arobas.net>
To: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
Cc: cryptography@c2.net
Message-ID: <20000504100059.A709@long-haul.net>
Reply-To: jetienne@arobas.net
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In-Reply-To: <v04210104b5372df3d1e4@[24.218.56.92]>; from reinhold@world.std.com on Thu, May 04, 2000 at 09:40:14AM -0400

On Thu, May 04, 2000 at 09:40:14AM -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
> Can anyone point me to a good definition of "Perfect Forward Security"?

In rfc2408 section 1.6.1 about ike, you can find one for perfect forward
secrecy. Up to you to decide how relevant and good it is.

"  Perfect Forward Secrecy: As described in [DOW92], an authenticated
   key exchange protocol provides perfect forward secrecy if disclosure
   of longterm secret keying material does not compromise the secrecy of
   the exchanged keys from previous communications.  The property of
   perfect forward secrecy does not apply to key exchange without
   authentication."

   [DOW92]    Diffie, W., M.Wiener, P. Van Oorschot, Authentication and
              Authenticated Key Exchanges, Designs, Codes, and
              Cryptography, 2, 107-125, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
              1992.



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