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Re: time dependant

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steven M. Bellovin)
Thu Mar 9 01:39:51 2000

From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>
To: "Matt Crawford" <crawdad@fnal.gov>
Cc: Cryptography <cryptography@c2.net>
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Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2000 10:56:25 -0500
Message-Id: <20000308155630.9912C41F16@SIGABA.research.att.com>

In message <200003081448.IAA17775@gungnir.fnal.gov>, "Matt Crawford" writes:
> 
> If you're going to trust that CryptoSat, inc. hasn't stashed a local
> copy of the private key, why not eliminate all that radio gear and trust
> CryptoTime, inc. not to publish the private key associated with date D
> before date D?

The minor answer is that I could postulate that CryptoSat sells slots for 
various parties (including senders of time-delayed messages) to install their 
own tamper-resistant boxes.

But the major answer is time scale -- I only have to trust CryptoSat for a 
short period, while I have to trust CryptoTime for the entire delay period.

The real answer, though, is that you're probably right -- there's too much 
temptation in this field to use technical mechanisms, when contract law will 
suffice.

		--Steve Bellovin




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