[6557] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [PGP]: PGP 6.5.2 Random Number Generator (RNG) support
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Martin Minow)
Wed Feb 2 16:43:58 2000
Message-ID: <3898A5E9.D66B3596@pobox.com>
Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 13:47:21 -0800
From: Martin Minow <minow@pobox.com>
Reply-To: minow@pobox.com
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To: lcs Mixmaster Remailer <mix@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
Cc: cryptography@c2.net
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lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
> As for the concerns about back doors, the best reference on
> the design of the RNG remains cryptography.com's analysis at
> http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
analysis, is that programmers cannot access the "raw" bitstream,
only the stream after the "digital post-processing" that converts
the bitstream into a stream of balanced 1 and 0 bits.
> And as pointed out before, this level of paranoia is ultimately self
> defeating, as Intel could just as easily put back doors into its CPU.
Also, there are much better places to leak information, including
keyboard and monitor designs that radiate detectable signals (the
"Tempest" problem).
Martin Minow
minow@pobox.com
