[6022] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Demise of H.R. 1714 and its lessons for Internet voting
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Trei, Peter)
Thu Nov 4 15:01:51 1999
Message-ID: <D104150098E6D111B7830000F8D90AE8E62B06@exna02.securitydynamics.com>
From: "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>
To: cryptography@c2.net, "'Ed Gerck'" <egerck@nma.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 1999 12:14:42 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This may be drifting off-topic, but...
One serious worry I have concerning
Internet voting schemes is that there
seems to be no consideration of making
the ballot secret.
If I go to my school auditorium to vote,
I fill out the ballot in a little hutch,
and no one but I can see what I have
*actually* put down (yes, I know the
protection is not absolute, but the
presence of mutually suspicious
poll-watchers makes it pretty good).
If I were to vote at home on my PC,
regardless of how good the cryptographic
protections are, I can see no way to
make shoulder surfing impossible.
This enables inducments. Examples:
"Honey - if I see you vote for
Feinstein I'll make it *real* *good*
for you tonight"
or
'This $50 bill is yours if I see you vote
Republican'.
Back in the old days, parties printed
their own ballots (sometimes on odd
colored paper) and could observe which
ballot a voter actually stuffed in the
box, and made pay-offs accordingly.
Are we headed back to this situation?
Peter Trei
> ----------
> From: Ed Gerck[SMTP:egerck@nma.com]
> Sent: Thursday, November 04, 1999 3:12 AM
> To: cryptography@c2.net
> Subject: Demise of H.R. 1714 and its lessons for Internet voting
>
>
> California - http://www.votesite.com/CIVI.PDF
>
> This initiative by the Attorney General of California aims to
> make California safe for Internet voting by creating an ad hoc
> validity for Internet voting while vacating current laws
> (including the California Constitution) and even theoretically
> possible laws that could impede the use of Internet voting in
> California.
>
>
