[5911] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: IP: IETF considers building wiretapping into the Internet
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Allen Ethridge)
Fri Oct 15 00:22:11 1999
Message-Id: <199910150317.WAA21408@mailhost.onramp.net>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 1999 22:17:54 -0500
From: Allen Ethridge <ethridge@onramp.net>
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>, jamesr@steptwo.com.au
Cc: cryptography@c2.net
In-Reply-To: <19991014134944.2C39541F16@SIGABA.research.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; Charset=US-ASCII
On 10/14/99 at 9:49 AM, smb@research.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin) wrote:
> In message <199910140102.UAA00978@mailhost.onramp.net>, Allen Ethridge writes:
> >
> > None of these things happened when CALEA was implemented in the traditional
> > circuit-switched voice network. CALEA advocates already have a success to
poi
> > nt
> > to.
>
> CALEA is not yet implemented; among the reasons are that the requirements from
> the FBI mandate a complex, expensive design. In other words, it's not a
> success.
I probably shouldn't have entered this conversation.
This is in part in response to James Robertson who wrote elsewhere:
> As an Australian, I am more than a little concerned
> that an American law enforcement agency is trying
> to dictate the design of an international communication
> standard.
>
> Does this mean they can wiretap Australian conversations
> as well?
I misspoke. CALEA has not yet been implemented. But building wiretapping
capability into voice switching systems is old and successful. The U.S.
government is not the first, even among democratic governments, to require this
capability. In a form other than CALEA it's already out there.
Now it's time for me to exercise my significantly over-developed senses of
melodrama and paranoia and leave this conversation.
Allen
