[5899] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: crypto camouflage in software
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Julian Assange)
Wed Oct 13 16:50:35 1999
To: "paul a. bauerschmidt" <bauersc@bauerschmidt.com>
Cc: cryptography@c2.net
Cc: proff@iq.org
From: Julian Assange <proff@iq.org>
Date: 14 Oct 1999 06:14:10 +1000
In-Reply-To: "paul a. bauerschmidt"'s message of "Fri, 8 Oct 1999 10:14:57 -0700 (PDT)"
Message-ID: <wxk8orhvcd.fsf@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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"paul a. bauerschmidt" <bauersc@bauerschmidt.com> writes:
> neat question:
>
> http://www.arcot.com/arcot_ieee.pdf
>
> a method of protecting private keys using camouflage, in software, to
> prevent dictionary attacks.
>
> one password will decrypt correctly, many other passwords will produce
> alternate, valid-looking keys to fool an attacker.
>
> is this an example of security through obscurity (a thought which many
> frown upon, it seems)?
>
>
> please feel free to mail me personally if you want to shred/shed light.
>
> .paul bauerschmidt
The trade off here is that if the attacker can get it wrong 1/n times,
so can the user (from miss-keying (i.e typing mistakes)). Depending on
the application, a low n might be disastrous.
--
Stefan Kahrs in [Kah96] discusses the
notion of completeness--programs which never go wrong can be
type-checked--which complements Milner's notion of
soundness--type-checked programs never go wrong [Mil78].
