[5677] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Why did White House change its mind on crypto?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steven M. Bellovin)
Sun Sep 19 11:57:37 1999
From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>
To: hgoodell@cs.uml.edu
Cc: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>, cryptography@c2.net,
cypherpunks <cypherpunks@cyberpass.net>
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Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 20:24:48 -0400
Message-Id: <19990919002454.3ABD441F16@SIGABA.research.att.com>
In message <37E411B0.89FDEDE6@mediaone.net>, Howie Goodell writes:
> It's (2) that's the real problem. They have this message they
> claim came from you, but the link to you is secret (maliced
keyboards; Windows 2000 backdoors, etc.) This has nothing to do
> with encryption -- since the evidence is plaintext -- it's a
> bugging case. However unlike wiretaps, a seized plaintext is
> not self-authenticating, unless you signed it with a private key
> the jury believes the Government didn't steal (hard to believe;
> how do we know they didn't watch you type your password and then
> fake the signature?) So if I were on a jury, why should I
> believe them?
I'm not a lawyer, but...
It's always possible to challenge the authenticity of evidence. The
government may not have to explain how they got it (though as I noted, I think
there's a good chance for a constitutional challenge here), but that won't
stop a clever defense attorney from casting doubt on it -- say, by pointing
out that Mark Furhman helped with the cryptanalysis....
--Steve Bellovin
