[5575] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Power analysis of AES candidates
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Andreas Bogk)
Sun Sep 12 13:02:31 1999
To: Russell Nelson <nelson@crynwr.com>
Cc: "Cryptography@C2. Net" <cryptography@c2.net>
From: Andreas Bogk <andreas@andreas.org>
Date: 10 Sep 1999 14:24:03 +0000
In-Reply-To: Russell Nelson's message of "Tue, 31 Aug 1999 13:13:37 -0400 (EDT)"
Russell Nelson <nelson@crynwr.com> writes:
> > There's some question about how hard it will be to design
> > hardware that will be DPA-resistant for different
> > algorithms.
> Big on-chip caps. Lithium batteries. Tamper-resistant housings.
The problem is that the caps probably have to be so large that
disabling them will be easy even if you don't have access to chip
analysis hardware. Lithium batteries are even easier to disable.
> That's what Dallas Semiconductor uses for its 1-Wire devices,
> including the famous Java ring. It works to protect data, but not
I suggest to cut one up and look at it. Of course it is still physical
manipulation, which makes it more difficult than DPA is right now,
but it's not the answer.
> You could also superglue the chip to something very hard, so that you
> can't probe the chip without getting the cover off, and if you try,
> you destroy the chip trying.
There are solvents that remove superglue.
Andreas
--
"Niemand hat die Absicht, eine Firewall einzurichten"
-- Peter Berlich <peter@berlich.de>, dasr
