[5561] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: plausible CAPI recovery designs (Re: FW: Cryptonym...)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (P.J. Ponder)
Thu Sep 9 15:33:00 1999
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 1999 10:19:12 -0400 (EDT)
From: "P.J. Ponder" <ponder@freenet.tlh.fl.us>
To: cryptography@c2.net, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
In-Reply-To: <199909090717.IAA18666@server.cypherspace.org>
On Thu, 9 Sep 1999, Adam Back wrote:
>
> This general area of discussion -- software modification
> authentication -- is a bit fuzzy: if you can modify the software you
> can patch out the check of the signature (a correctly placed NOP is
> known to do it).
One of the things SET had right was including the fingerprint of the next
(replacement or fallback) key in the cert. It would seem to be a simple
matter to implement the way they did with the SET spec.
The next key, of course, has to stored securely.
