[5505] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: NSA key in MSFT Crypto API
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Trei, Peter)
Fri Sep 3 14:08:01 1999
From: "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@securitydynamics.com>
To: "'Lucky Green'" <shamrock@cypherpunks.to>,
"cypherpunks@Algebra. COM" <cypherpunks@Algebra.COM>,
"'Salz, Rich'" <SalzR@CertCo.com>
Cc: "Cryptography@C2. Net" <cryptography@c2.net>, bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1999 11:49:43 -0400
The ability to replace the NSA key with another
is an extremely serious vulnerability. This means that
*anyone* - not just the NSA - can write a compromised
module and install it on the target, as long as they
also replace the NSA key with the one they used to
sign the weakened module.
Tripwire, anyone?
Peter Trei
> ----------
> From: Salz, Rich[SMTP:SalzR@CertCo.com]
> Sent: Friday, September 03, 1999 10:42 AM
> To: 'Lucky Green'; cypherpunks@Algebra. COM
> Cc: Cryptography@C2. Net; bugtraq@securityfocus.com
> Subject: RE: NSA key in MSFT Crypto API
>
> >For more information and a program to remove the NSA's key from your copy
> of
> >Windows 95, 98, NT, 2000, see
> >http://www.cryptonym.com/hottopics/msft-nsa.html
>
> Perhaps more interestingly, the program lets you replace the key, too.
> It requires no special privileges -- just uses some undocumented API's.
>
> It would be ...interesting... for someone to combine that program with
> Melissa, where the body of the messages was a public/private keypair.
> /r$
>
